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Strategic credibility.

Armstrong-Taylor, Paul.

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Strategic credibility.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Strategic credibility./
作者:	Armstrong-Taylor, Paul.
面頁冊數:	106 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 66-04, Section: A, page: 1453.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International66-04A.
標題:	Economics, Theory. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3173850
ISBN:	0542112450

Strategic credibility.
Armstrong-Taylor, Paul.

Strategic credibility. - 106 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 66-04, Section: A, page: 1453.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Harvard University, 2005.

This thesis explores the role of a reputation for honesty, or credibility, in strategic situations. This is an important advance on existing models that assume that there are no honest agents and therefore no credibility effects.

ISBN: 0542112450Subjects--Topical Terms:

1017575
Economics, Theory.

Strategic credibility.
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300 $a 106 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 66-04, Section: A, page: 1453.
500 $a Advisers: Caroline Hoxby; Markus Mobius.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--Harvard University, 2005.
520 $a This thesis explores the role of a reputation for honesty, or credibility, in strategic situations. This is an important advance on existing models that assume that there are no honest agents and therefore no credibility effects.
520 $a The first chapter explores what influences somebody to lie or tell the truth. It identifies two effects working through reputations: lying is attractive if trust is unimportant and if payoffs are convex. These effects help explain the behavior of politicians during the House bank scandal of 1991--92.
520 $a The second chapter considers how the presence of some honest agents can allow a principal to profitably incentivize effort from agents in a repeated, moral hazard game---something that would not be possible if all agents were opportunistic. In an repeated game with a sufficiently high discount factor, it will be optimal for the principal to test the agents in early periods by providing incentives for the opportunistic (non-honest) agents to lie and so reveal their type.
520 $a The third chapter considers the impact of introducing credibility into a career concerns model. In the standard career concerns model, adverse selection problems will be exacerbated by reputational concerns. A contract that might separate different abilities in a static setting may fail in a dynamic setting because the bad type will not want to be revealed as bad. This is, essentially, the argument put forward by Laffont and Tirole (1988). However, when we introduce an honest type, a second reputational effect exists which may offset the first and help support a separating equilibrium in a dynamic setting. This may also improve efficiency.
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