東華大學圖書館 |

Language: English

Help

回圖書館首頁

手機版館藏查詢

Back

Switch To: Labeled | MARC Mode | ISBD

Law and finance in historical perspe...

Musacchio, Aldo.

Linked to FindBook

Google Book

Amazon

博客來

Law and finance in historical perspective: Politics, bankruptcy law, and corporate governance in Brazil, 1850--2002.

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Law and finance in historical perspective: Politics, bankruptcy law, and corporate governance in Brazil, 1850--2002./
Author:	Musacchio, Aldo.
Description:	195 p.
Notes:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 66-04, Section: A, page: 1469.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International66-04A.
Subject:	History, Latin American. -
Online resource:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3171820
ISBN:	0542087286

Law and finance in historical perspective: Politics, bankruptcy law, and corporate governance in Brazil, 1850--2002.
Musacchio, Aldo.

Law and finance in historical perspective: Politics, bankruptcy law, and corporate governance in Brazil, 1850--2002. - 195 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 66-04, Section: A, page: 1469.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Stanford University, 2005.

Do early institutions exert a long-term impact on subsequent institutional and economic development? Do endowments and legal tradition explain the subsequent development of financial markets and rule of law? An influential stream of the economics literature explains development levels around the world using as explanatory variables institutions adopted in the distant past. In particular, the "law and finance" literature has argued that legal origin---e.g. civil and common law---determines both the extent of investor protections and the level of financial market development of a country (La Porta, Lopez de Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, 1997, 1998, 2000). Furthermore, extensions of this literature have argued that conditions at the time of colonization, such as settler mortality, are powerful explanatory variables of financial development in ex-colonies (Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 2003; 2003b). The empirical work of these studies has showed that being a Civil Law country is correlated with having poor protection of investors and small financial markets. This dissertation challenges these hypotheses by showing the historical variation in investor protections and equity and bond markets in Brazil---a Civil Law country. Rather than having legal origin determining these variables, I argue that the variation in financial market size responds to international capital cycles, while the variance in investor protections is better explained by the historical changes in the interests of ruling coalitions. In order to study investor protections, I created creditor and shareholder rights indices following the "law and finance" methodology and looked at their enforcement. My analysis of creditor rights and court cases shows that creditor rights in Brazil were relatively strong between 1850 and 1940. The analysis of shareholder protections and corporate ownership demonstrates that shareholder rights got stronger on paper from 1882 to 2001---with a minor setback in the 1990s, while equity ownership got increasingly more concentrated after 1940. I end by suggesting that increasing popular participation in financial markets might be a good way to commit governments to protect investors.

ISBN: 0542087286Subjects--Topical Terms:

1017580
History, Latin American.

Law and finance in historical perspective: Politics, bankruptcy law, and corporate governance in Brazil, 1850--2002.
LDR:03172nmm 2200301 4500 001 1812508
005 20060424072442.5
008 130610s2005 eng d
020 $a 0542087286
035 $a (UnM)AAI3171820
035 $a AAI3171820
040 $a UnM $c UnM
100 1 $a Musacchio, Aldo. $3 1902053
245 1 0 $a Law and finance in historical perspective: Politics, bankruptcy law, and corporate governance in Brazil, 1850--2002.
300 $a 195 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 66-04, Section: A, page: 1469.
500 $a Adviser: Stephen Haber.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--Stanford University, 2005.
520 $a Do early institutions exert a long-term impact on subsequent institutional and economic development? Do endowments and legal tradition explain the subsequent development of financial markets and rule of law? An influential stream of the economics literature explains development levels around the world using as explanatory variables institutions adopted in the distant past. In particular, the "law and finance" literature has argued that legal origin---e.g. civil and common law---determines both the extent of investor protections and the level of financial market development of a country (La Porta, Lopez de Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, 1997, 1998, 2000). Furthermore, extensions of this literature have argued that conditions at the time of colonization, such as settler mortality, are powerful explanatory variables of financial development in ex-colonies (Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 2003; 2003b). The empirical work of these studies has showed that being a Civil Law country is correlated with having poor protection of investors and small financial markets. This dissertation challenges these hypotheses by showing the historical variation in investor protections and equity and bond markets in Brazil---a Civil Law country. Rather than having legal origin determining these variables, I argue that the variation in financial market size responds to international capital cycles, while the variance in investor protections is better explained by the historical changes in the interests of ruling coalitions. In order to study investor protections, I created creditor and shareholder rights indices following the "law and finance" methodology and looked at their enforcement. My analysis of creditor rights and court cases shows that creditor rights in Brazil were relatively strong between 1850 and 1940. The analysis of shareholder protections and corporate ownership demonstrates that shareholder rights got stronger on paper from 1882 to 2001---with a minor setback in the 1990s, while equity ownership got increasingly more concentrated after 1940. I end by suggesting that increasing popular participation in financial markets might be a good way to commit governments to protect investors.
590 $a School code: 0212.
650 4 $a History, Latin American. $3 1017580
650 4 $a Economics, History. $3 1017418
650 4 $a Business Administration, Management. $3 626628
650 4 $a Law. $3 600858
690 $a 0336
690 $a 0509
690 $a 0454
690 $a 0398
710 2 0 $a Stanford University. $3 754827
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 66-04A.
790 1 0 $a Haber, Stephen, $e advisor
790 $a 0212
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2005
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3171820