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Delegation and Agency in Internation...

Hawkins, Darren G.

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Delegation and Agency in International Organizations.

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Delegation and Agency in International Organizations./
Author:	Hawkins, Darren G.
other author:	Lake, David A.
Published:	Leiden :Cambridge University Press, : 2006.,
Description:	426 p.
[NT 15003449]:	Contents; Figures; Tables; Notes on contributors; Preface; 1 Delegation under anarchy: states, international organizations, and principal-agent theory; 2 Who delegates? Alternative models of principals in development aid; 3 US domestic politics and International Monetary Fund policy; 4 Why multilateralism? Foreign aid and domestic principal-agent problems; 5 Distribution, information, and delegation to international organizations: the case of IMF conditionality; 6 Delegation and discretion in the European Union; 7 How agents matter
[NT 15003449]:	8 Screening power: international organizations as informative agents9 Dutiful agents, rogue actors, or both? Staffing, voting rules, and slack in the WHO and WTO; 10 Delegating IMF conditionality: understanding variations in control and conformity; 11 Delegation to international courts and the limits of re-contracting political power; 12 The logic of delegation to international organizations; References; Index
Subject:	International organization. -
Online resource:	http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511491368Click here to view book
ISBN:	9780511491368 (electronic bk.)

Delegation and Agency in International Organizations.
Hawkins, Darren G.

Delegation and Agency in International Organizations.[electronic resource]. - Leiden :Cambridge University Press,2006. - 426 p.

Contents; Figures; Tables; Notes on contributors; Preface; 1 Delegation under anarchy: states, international organizations, and principal-agent theory; 2 Who delegates? Alternative models of principals in development aid; 3 US domestic politics and International Monetary Fund policy; 4 Why multilateralism? Foreign aid and domestic principal-agent problems; 5 Distribution, information, and delegation to international organizations: the case of IMF conditionality; 6 Delegation and discretion in the European Union; 7 How agents matter

Why do governments increasingly delegate sovereign authority to international organizations and what are the consequences of such choices? This volume employs a broad range of empirical techniques to answer these questions and argues that the issues involved in controlling international bureaucracies are very similar to those faced in domestic politics.

Electronic reproduction.

Available via World Wide Web.

Mode of access: World Wide Web.

ISBN: 9780511491368 (electronic bk.)Subjects--Topical Terms:

553173
International organization.
Index Terms--Genre/Form:

542853
Electronic books.

LC Class. No.: JZ5566 .D45 2006eb

Dewey Class. No.: 341.2

Delegation and Agency in International Organizations.
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020 $a 9780521680462 (print)
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050 0 0 $a JZ5566 .D45 2006eb
082 0 0 $a 341.2 $a 352.3/6
100 1 $a Hawkins, Darren G. $3 1898861
245 1 0 $a Delegation and Agency in International Organizations. $h [electronic resource].
260 $a Leiden : $b Cambridge University Press, $c 2006.
300 $a 426 p.
505 0 $a Contents; Figures; Tables; Notes on contributors; Preface; 1 Delegation under anarchy: states, international organizations, and principal-agent theory; 2 Who delegates? Alternative models of principals in development aid; 3 US domestic politics and International Monetary Fund policy; 4 Why multilateralism? Foreign aid and domestic principal-agent problems; 5 Distribution, information, and delegation to international organizations: the case of IMF conditionality; 6 Delegation and discretion in the European Union; 7 How agents matter
505 8 $a 8 Screening power: international organizations as informative agents9 Dutiful agents, rogue actors, or both? Staffing, voting rules, and slack in the WHO and WTO; 10 Delegating IMF conditionality: understanding variations in control and conformity; 11 Delegation to international courts and the limits of re-contracting political power; 12 The logic of delegation to international organizations; References; Index
520 $a Why do governments increasingly delegate sovereign authority to international organizations and what are the consequences of such choices? This volume employs a broad range of empirical techniques to answer these questions and argues that the issues involved in controlling international bureaucracies are very similar to those faced in domestic politics.
533 $a Electronic reproduction. $n Available via World Wide Web.
538 $a Mode of access: World Wide Web.
650 4 $a International organization. $3 553173
655 7 $a Electronic books. $2 lcsh $3 542853
700 1 $a Lake, David A. $3 574278
700 1 $a Nielson, Daniel L. $3 1898862
700 1 $a Tierney, Michael J. $3 942705
710 2 $a Ebooks Corporation. $3 1314793
776 1 $z 9780521680462
856 4 0 $z Click here to view book $u http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511491368