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Essays on microeconomics with incomp...

Zheng, Jie.

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Essays on microeconomics with incomplete information.

Record Type:	Language materials, printed : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Essays on microeconomics with incomplete information./
Author:	Zheng, Jie.
Description:	116 p.
Notes:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 72-07, Section: A, page: .
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International72-07A.
Subject:	Economics, General. -
Online resource:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3450642
ISBN:	9781124595771

Essays on microeconomics with incomplete information.
Zheng, Jie.

Essays on microeconomics with incomplete information. - 116 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 72-07, Section: A, page: .

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Washington University in St. Louis, 2011.

My dissertation devotes to the understanding of people's interactions under uncertainty. It contains four essays on Microeconomics with Incomplete Information.1

ISBN: 9781124595771Subjects--Topical Terms:

1017424
Economics, General.

Essays on microeconomics with incomplete information.
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008 130515s2011 ||||||||||||||||| ||eng d
020 $a 9781124595771
035 $a (UMI)AAI3450642
035 $a AAI3450642
040 $a UMI $c UMI
100 1 $a Zheng, Jie. $3 1058666
245 1 0 $a Essays on microeconomics with incomplete information.
300 $a 116 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 72-07, Section: A, page: .
500 $a Advisers: David K. Levine; John R. Conlon.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--Washington University in St. Louis, 2011.
520 $a My dissertation devotes to the understanding of people's interactions under uncertainty. It contains four essays on Microeconomics with Incomplete Information.1
520 $a Chapter 1 focuses on the existence of rational bubbles in an Allen-Morris-Postlewaite (1993) setting, and finds positive and negative results for bubbles in an asset market featuring rational expectations equilibrium. An expected bubble is said to exist if it is mutual knowledge that the price of the asset is higher than the expected dividend. Similarly we call it a strong bubble if everyone knows that the price is higher than the maximum possible dividend. Substituting common knowledge for mutual knowledge, I develop the new concepts of a common expected bubble and a common strong bubble. In a simple finite horizon model with asymmetric information and short sales constraints, I show that the following results hold for any finite number of agents. First, under the implicit assumption of perfect memory, common strong bubbles never exist in any rational expectations equilibrium. Second, it is possible to have one that is both a strong bubble and a common expected bubble in a rational expectations equilibrium. Based on these results, this paper, as well as Conlon (2004) and many others, provides a partial answer to the question: What properties do rational bubbles have in a rational expectations equilibrium?
520 $a In Chapter 2, I study the relationship between information improvement and welfare outcomes in a finite-player finite-state model with incomplete information. In a context of strategic interactions, it is possible that people may prefer to be ignorant rather than knowledgeable. Three simple examples are studied carefully in order to provide economic insight for this observation: if players were allowed to (not forced to) forget at no cost, they might have incentives to do so in equilibrium, and their expected payoff could actually be improved. In a general setting where players simultaneously choose whether to forget or not before the state of the world is realized, I show that players' actions would reveal additional information and that their preferences must be negatively correlated, for forgetfulness to be part of a possible equilibrium strategy. This finding indicates that in a world of incomplete information, people may not be made better off by obtaining more information, and they may even have incentive to be forgetful. These results will have important applications in policy design.
520 $a Many economic models of rational bubbles are not very robust to perturbations. The existence of bubbles in these models requires strong conditions to be satisfied. In Chapter 3, we first study the bubble examples in the first Chapter and show that those bubbles are robust to both strongly symmetric perturbations in beliefs and very symmetric perturbations in dividends, but not robust to general perturbations. Then we construct a new three-period two-agent robust bubble example where small variations in parameters do not eliminate the bubble equilibria. The idea is that assuming continuum of states can lead to a robust bubble equilibrium where each bad type of the seller pools with some good type of the seller. This provides a new answer to the question: How robust can rational bubbles be in a finite horizon model?
520 $a Morris, Shin and Postlewaite (1993) show an upper bound of asset prices in Rational Expectations Equilibrium. Chapter 4 is a note that strengthens their result by providing a tighter upper bound and hence offers a better answer to the question: How large can a bubble be in equilibrium?
520 $a 1 Chapter 3 is based on joint work with John Conlon (University of Mississippi).
590 $a School code: 0252.
650 4 $a Economics, General. $3 1017424
650 4 $a Economics, Finance. $3 626650
650 4 $a Economics, Theory. $3 1017575
690 $a 0501
690 $a 0508
690 $a 0511
710 2 $a Washington University in St. Louis. $b Economics. $3 1672998
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 72-07A.
790 1 0 $a Levine, David K., $e advisor
790 1 0 $a Conlon, John R., $e advisor
790 1 0 $a Berliant, Marcus $e committee member
790 1 0 $a Dybvig, Philip H. $e committee member
790 1 0 $a Lau, Stephanie $e committee member
790 1 0 $a Liu, Hong $e committee member
790 1 0 $a Nachbar, John H. $e committee member
790 1 0 $a Said, Maher $e committee member
790 $a 0252
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2011
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3450642