東華大學圖書館 |

Language: English

Help

回圖書館首頁

手機版館藏查詢

Back

Switch To: Labeled | MARC Mode | ISBD

Patent policy and entry: Evidence fr...

Mulcahy, Andrew.

Linked to FindBook

Google Book

Amazon

博客來

Patent policy and entry: Evidence from pharmaceutical patent challenges.

Record Type:	Language materials, printed : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Patent policy and entry: Evidence from pharmaceutical patent challenges./
Author:	Mulcahy, Andrew.
Description:	150 p.
Notes:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 72-09, Section: A, page: .
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International72-09A.
Subject:	Economics, General. -
Online resource:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3463027
ISBN:	9781124731377

Patent policy and entry: Evidence from pharmaceutical patent challenges.
Mulcahy, Andrew.

Patent policy and entry: Evidence from pharmaceutical patent challenges. - 150 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 72-09, Section: A, page: .

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Pennsylvania, 2011.

The onset of generic competition in pharmaceutical markets is increasingly determined by patent challenge rather than patent expiration. I exploit features of the pharmaceutical industry's "Paragraph IV" patent challenge process and comprehensive 2004-2009 data to study why and which generic entrants challenge innovator patents and estimate the impact of such challenges on industry and consumers. I model generic firms' entry decisions as a function of patent portfolio characteristics, market size, and other factors affecting entrants' expected costs and payoffs. Patent challenges are more likely in markets with greater on-patent innovator sales and more related presentations. While this may be partly attributed to a 180-day generic exclusivity "prize" granted to the first challenger, other early mover advantages seem to exist. Larger originator patent portfolios and portfolios with higher average citation rates raise entry costs and decrease the probability and intensity of challenge. The effect of patents on challenge varies by patent type. In particular, certain relatively weak patent types are more likely to be used strategically by innovators to deter or delay challenge. Limitations introduced in the 2003 Medicare Modernization Act to limit the strategic use of patents did decrease challenge costs. Overall, patent challenges subject significant innovator sales and on-patent years to generic competition. Under various assumptions, early generic entry due to patent challenges generated between

ISBN: 9781124731377Subjects--Topical Terms:

1017424
Economics, General.

Patent policy and entry: Evidence from pharmaceutical patent challenges.
LDR:02784nam 2200313 4500 001 1404950
005 20111201133011.5
008 130515s2011 ||||||||||||||||| ||eng d
020 $a 9781124731377
035 $a (UMI)AAI3463027
035 $a AAI3463027
040 $a UMI $c UMI
100 1 $a Mulcahy, Andrew. $3 1684302
245 1 0 $a Patent policy and entry: Evidence from pharmaceutical patent challenges.
300 $a 150 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 72-09, Section: A, page: .
500 $a Adviser: Patricia M. Danzon.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Pennsylvania, 2011.
520 $a The onset of generic competition in pharmaceutical markets is increasingly determined by patent challenge rather than patent expiration. I exploit features of the pharmaceutical industry's "Paragraph IV" patent challenge process and comprehensive 2004-2009 data to study why and which generic entrants challenge innovator patents and estimate the impact of such challenges on industry and consumers. I model generic firms' entry decisions as a function of patent portfolio characteristics, market size, and other factors affecting entrants' expected costs and payoffs. Patent challenges are more likely in markets with greater on-patent innovator sales and more related presentations. While this may be partly attributed to a 180-day generic exclusivity "prize" granted to the first challenger, other early mover advantages seem to exist. Larger originator patent portfolios and portfolios with higher average citation rates raise entry costs and decrease the probability and intensity of challenge. The effect of patents on challenge varies by patent type. In particular, certain relatively weak patent types are more likely to be used strategically by innovators to deter or delay challenge. Limitations introduced in the 2003 Medicare Modernization Act to limit the strategic use of patents did decrease challenge costs. Overall, patent challenges subject significant innovator sales and on-patent years to generic competition. Under various assumptions, early generic entry due to patent challenges generated between $4 .3 and $8 .5 billion in savings to consumers from 2004 to 2009. The net welfare effect of patent challenges is difficult to characterize and must consider litigation costs and other factors. Regulatory exclusivity alternatives to the current patent-based systems may yield similar outcomes at lower societal cost.
520 $a
590 $a School code: 0175.
650 4 $a Economics, General. $3 1017424
650 4 $a Legal Studies. $3 1669774
650 4 $a Sociology, Public and Social Welfare. $3 1017909
650 4 $a Health Sciences, Health Care Management. $3 1017922
690 $a 0501
690 $a 0553
690 $a 0630
690 $a 0769
710 2 $a University of Pennsylvania. $3 1017401
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 72-09A.
790 1 0 $a Danzon, Patricia M., $e advisor
790 $a 0175
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2011
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3463027