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A non-reductive naturalist approach ...

Zhong, Lei.

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A non-reductive naturalist approach to moral explanation.

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,印刷品 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	A non-reductive naturalist approach to moral explanation./
作者:	Zhong, Lei.
面頁冊數:	139 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 71-11, Section: A, page: 4048.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International71-11A.
標題:	Epistemology. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3429439
ISBN:	9781124284392

A non-reductive naturalist approach to moral explanation.
Zhong, Lei.

A non-reductive naturalist approach to moral explanation. - 139 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 71-11, Section: A, page: 4048.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Michigan, 2010.

Many philosophers insist that moral facts or properties play no role in explaining (non-normative) natural phenomena. The problem of moral explanation has raised metaphysical, semantic and epistemic challenges to contemporary moral realism. In my dissertation, I attempt to vindicate the explanatory efficacy of moral properties, while at the same time respecting the autonomy and normativity of morality. In doing so, I will advocate a sort of non-reductive ethical naturalism, according to which moral properties are natural properties (in the sense that they are open to empirical investigation), and yet remain irreducible to non-normative natural properties, such as psychological, biological, and sociological properties.

ISBN: 9781124284392Subjects--Topical Terms:

896969
Epistemology.

A non-reductive naturalist approach to moral explanation.
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245 1 2 $a A non-reductive naturalist approach to moral explanation.
300 $a 139 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 71-11, Section: A, page: 4048.
500 $a Adviser: Peter A. Railton.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Michigan, 2010.
520 $a Many philosophers insist that moral facts or properties play no role in explaining (non-normative) natural phenomena. The problem of moral explanation has raised metaphysical, semantic and epistemic challenges to contemporary moral realism. In my dissertation, I attempt to vindicate the explanatory efficacy of moral properties, while at the same time respecting the autonomy and normativity of morality. In doing so, I will advocate a sort of non-reductive ethical naturalism, according to which moral properties are natural properties (in the sense that they are open to empirical investigation), and yet remain irreducible to non-normative natural properties, such as psychological, biological, and sociological properties.
520 $a More specifically, I develop a form of moral functionalism to vindicate moral explanation. Moral functionalism understands moral properties as second-order, functional properties, the natures of which are characterized in terms of functional roles. My version of moral functionalism has two particular features. First, it is a form of a posteriori moral functionalism. The moral theory used to characterize the functional roles of moral properties can only be discovered by appeal to empirical investigation (for this reason, my a posteriori version of moral functionalism is a sort of ethical naturalism). Second, it is a holistic version of moral functionalism. The functional role of a moral property cannot be identified solely in terms of non-normative properties; rather, it essentially involves a network of connections to both non-normative and normative properties (for this reason, my holistic version of moral functionalism is a sort of ethical anti-reductionism).
520 $a It is important to note that the question of whether moral properties have explanatory power bears on the question of what explanation or explanatoriness is. In my dissertation, I attempt to show that my vindication of moral explanation presupposes a plausible account of explanation. Obviously I cannot discuss all theories of explanation; my dissertation will rather focus on two influential accounts of explanation: the causalist model and the unificationist model. Then I argue that moral properties understood as functional properties of the kind I have described can do causal-explanatory work and play a distinctive unifying role.
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