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Revolution, war, and offensive realism.

Ewenstein, Paul.

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Revolution, war, and offensive realism.

Record Type:	Language materials, printed : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Revolution, war, and offensive realism./
Author:	Ewenstein, Paul.
Description:	213 p.
Notes:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 72-04, Section: A, page: .
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International72-04A.
Subject:	History, Modern. -
Online resource:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3445726
ISBN:	9781124492377

Revolution, war, and offensive realism.
Ewenstein, Paul.

Revolution, war, and offensive realism. - 213 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 72-04, Section: A, page: .

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Boston University, 2011.

Most studies of revolutionary wars have focused on the role played by ideology or threat perception to explain the prevalence of such conflicts. I instead argue that the occurrence or non-occurrence of these wars can best be explained using an offensive realist approach. Revolutions sometimes appear to other countries to temporarily reduce the power of the revolutionary state, while not convincing the revolutionaries that their country is weak. As a result, when the other countries try to take advantage of that weakness, the revolutionaries refuse to give in to their demands, a refusal which leads to war. Because the revolutionary state is stronger than it appears, these wars generally go poorly for the attackers, who soon find themselves on the defensive. The success of the revolutionary state alarms other powers, which balance against it, leading to stalemate and ultimately, to peace. This model of revolutionary conflict is first argued for theoretically and then compared to the historical record in case studies of the French, Russian, and Iranian Revolutions. In each of these cases, a war is examined and contrasted with another similar, crisis in which war did not ensue because there was not a disagreement about relative power. Finally, the lessons learned from these case studies are discussed, as well as the implications of this research for the structural realist paradigm as a whole.

ISBN: 9781124492377Subjects--Topical Terms:

516334
History, Modern.

Revolution, war, and offensive realism.
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020 $a 9781124492377
035 $a (UMI)AAI3445726
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040 $a UMI $c UMI
100 1 $a Ewenstein, Paul. $3 1679623
245 1 0 $a Revolution, war, and offensive realism.
300 $a 213 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 72-04, Section: A, page: .
500 $a Adviser: Robert Jackson.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--Boston University, 2011.
520 $a Most studies of revolutionary wars have focused on the role played by ideology or threat perception to explain the prevalence of such conflicts. I instead argue that the occurrence or non-occurrence of these wars can best be explained using an offensive realist approach. Revolutions sometimes appear to other countries to temporarily reduce the power of the revolutionary state, while not convincing the revolutionaries that their country is weak. As a result, when the other countries try to take advantage of that weakness, the revolutionaries refuse to give in to their demands, a refusal which leads to war. Because the revolutionary state is stronger than it appears, these wars generally go poorly for the attackers, who soon find themselves on the defensive. The success of the revolutionary state alarms other powers, which balance against it, leading to stalemate and ultimately, to peace. This model of revolutionary conflict is first argued for theoretically and then compared to the historical record in case studies of the French, Russian, and Iranian Revolutions. In each of these cases, a war is examined and contrasted with another similar, crisis in which war did not ensue because there was not a disagreement about relative power. Finally, the lessons learned from these case studies are discussed, as well as the implications of this research for the structural realist paradigm as a whole.
590 $a School code: 0017.
650 4 $a History, Modern. $3 516334
650 4 $a Political Science, International Relations. $3 1669648
650 4 $a Political Science, General. $3 1017391
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710 2 $a Boston University. $3 1017454
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 72-04A.
790 1 0 $a Jackson, Robert, $e advisor
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791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2011
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3445726