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The effect of school based managemen...

Bando, Rosangela.

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The effect of school based management on parent behavior and the quality of education in Mexico.

Record Type:	Language materials, printed : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	The effect of school based management on parent behavior and the quality of education in Mexico./
Author:	Bando, Rosangela.
Description:	126 p.
Notes:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 71-09, Section: A, page: 3347.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International71-09A.
Subject:	Education, Policy. -
Online resource:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3413310
ISBN:	9781124140056

The effect of school based management on parent behavior and the quality of education in Mexico.
Bando, Rosangela.

The effect of school based management on parent behavior and the quality of education in Mexico. - 126 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 71-09, Section: A, page: 3347.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of California, Berkeley, 2010.

Institutional reforms have been proposed to improve the delivery and financing of education. School Based Management (SBM) is one such institutional reform where decision making is transferred to the school level. Funds are transferred directly to the school and parents, along with teachers and the principal, allocate and oversee the use of program funds. By increasing parental and community involvement in schools, SBM is expected to improve education because it is expected to increase accountability and monitoring of school personnel, align incentives and match resource allocation to school needs. Additionally, SBM seeks to increase school autonomy and implement assessments and evaluations. With these ideas in mind, the Mexican Education Ministry has implemented SBM programs in over 30% of elementary public schools in the country.

ISBN: 9781124140056Subjects--Topical Terms:

1669130
Education, Policy.

The effect of school based management on parent behavior and the quality of education in Mexico.
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020 $a 9781124140056
035 $a (UMI)AAI3413310
035 $a AAI3413310
040 $a UMI $c UMI
100 1 $a Bando, Rosangela. $3 1675920
245 1 4 $a The effect of school based management on parent behavior and the quality of education in Mexico.
300 $a 126 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 71-09, Section: A, page: 3347.
500 $a Adviser: Elisabeth Sadoulet.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of California, Berkeley, 2010.
520 $a Institutional reforms have been proposed to improve the delivery and financing of education. School Based Management (SBM) is one such institutional reform where decision making is transferred to the school level. Funds are transferred directly to the school and parents, along with teachers and the principal, allocate and oversee the use of program funds. By increasing parental and community involvement in schools, SBM is expected to improve education because it is expected to increase accountability and monitoring of school personnel, align incentives and match resource allocation to school needs. Additionally, SBM seeks to increase school autonomy and implement assessments and evaluations. With these ideas in mind, the Mexican Education Ministry has implemented SBM programs in over 30% of elementary public schools in the country.
520 $a This dissertation is an effort to learn from the Mexican experience with two SBM programs: The largest SBM program in Mexico and a randomly allocated program in the state of Veracruz. The Quality Schools Program (Programa Escuelas de Calidad, PEC) was first implemented in 2001 and provides an opportunity to learn how SBM has evolved with time. The Veracruz experiment provides short run information on participation by parents on school related activities which is not available for PEC and overcomes the potential self selection problem that has plagued SBM evaluations so far.
520 $a The mechanisms I explore are five. First, I analyze how the programs change the cash transfers that parents voluntarily make to the school. If parents substitute voluntary contributions with program funds then the program causes crowding out. In this case there would be no change in resources available to the school and therefore no effect from improved conditions on the quality of education. Second, I analyze whether the matching scheme of PEC creates incentives for parents to increase voluntary contributions and if so, whether the incentive is different for rich and poor schools. Third, I analyze how the program caused parents to change their time investment. Parents may use program funds to either complement or substitute their participation on school related activities. Fourth, I make use of improved data availability to make a more accurate assessment of the effects of the programs on the quality of education as measured by standardized test scores and failure rates. Finally, I analyze if the effects of PEC change over time.
520 $a This dissertation is organized as follows: Chapter I is an analysis of the effects of PEC on voluntary contributions, standardized test scores, failure rates and dropout rates over time, chapter II is a study on the effects of PEC on voluntary contributions as a function of school income and chapter III analyzes the effect of the randomized Veracruz experiment on voluntary contributions, parent participation, standardized test scores and failure rates. Voluntary contributions are cash transfers that parents choose to make to the school to cover salient needs. The contribution amount is set at the beginning of the school year by the parent's association and once it is set, all parents are expected to pay it. Payment is socially enforced. I find no evidence of any of the two programs causing crowding out. Moreover, I find that the matching scheme of PEC creates an incentive for parents in the poorest schools to increase voluntary contributions more. Therefore matching works as a targeting device because more government resources go to the schools with greater needs. On the opposite, PEC decreases the probability of a student moving to a different school in urban areas. Therefore parents may be more satisfied with school services. There is no effect on voluntary contributions on the Veracruz experiment which lacks the matching scheme in PEC. In this program, funds and institutional improvements in the school act as a way to balance parent participation. I find no effects of either of the two programs in the short run on the quality of education as measured by standardized test scores and failure rates. For the Veracruz experiment where data is available, it is observed that most program funds were invested on infrastructure improvements and therefore it is not surprising not to find effects in the short run. Consistent with findings in the US, the effects of PEC are larger as the school gains experience. Moreover, initial adjustments have a slight negative effect. For example, the average math test score decreases in one point the first year but increases 4 points in the fourth year. The average math test score is 487 points on a scale that ranges from 200 to 800, therefore changes are small but increasing. (Abstract shortened by UMI.)
590 $a School code: 0028.
650 4 $a Education, Policy. $3 1669130
650 4 $a Economics, General. $3 1017424
650 4 $a Education, Administration. $3 626645
690 $a 0458
690 $a 0501
690 $a 0514
710 2 $a University of California, Berkeley. $b Agricultural & Resource Economics. $3 1673761
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 71-09A.
790 1 0 $a Sadoulet, Elisabeth, $e advisor
790 1 0 $a Simon, Leo K. $e committee member
790 1 0 $a Gertler, Paul J. $e committee member
790 $a 0028
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2010
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3413310