東華大學圖書館 |

Language: English

Help

回圖書館首頁

手機版館藏查詢

Back

Switch To: Labeled | MARC Mode | ISBD

Thinking ahead: Time horizons and th...

Blake, Daniel J.

Linked to FindBook

Google Book

Amazon

博客來

Thinking ahead: Time horizons and the legalization of international investment agreements.

Record Type:	Language materials, printed : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Thinking ahead: Time horizons and the legalization of international investment agreements./
Author:	Blake, Daniel J.
Description:	282 p.
Notes:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 72-01, Section: A, page: .
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International72-01A.
Subject:	Economics, Finance. -
Online resource:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3435708
ISBN:	9781124347363

Thinking ahead: Time horizons and the legalization of international investment agreements.
Blake, Daniel J.

Thinking ahead: Time horizons and the legalization of international investment agreements. - 282 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 72-01, Section: A, page: .

Thesis (Ph.D.)--The Ohio State University, 2010.

This dissertation seeks to explain why international investment agreements, despite being created with the same purposes and functions in mind, often display important variation in their degree of legalization. I posit that such variation exists because legalization creates a trade-off - between making credible commitments to foreign investors and retaining autonomous control over investment policies - that governments choose to resolve differently. Therefore, to explain the legalization of investment agreements, I develop a theory which explains how governments resolve the credibility-autonomy trade-off, leading them to conclude agreements with varying levels of legalization.

ISBN: 9781124347363Subjects--Topical Terms:

626650
Economics, Finance.

Thinking ahead: Time horizons and the legalization of international investment agreements.
LDR:03748nam 2200301 4500 001 1396325
005 20110603090802.5
008 130515s2010 ||||||||||||||||| ||eng d
020 $a 9781124347363
035 $a (UMI)AAI3435708
035 $a AAI3435708
040 $a UMI $c UMI
100 1 $a Blake, Daniel J. $3 1675099
245 1 0 $a Thinking ahead: Time horizons and the legalization of international investment agreements.
300 $a 282 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 72-01, Section: A, page: .
500 $a Adviser: Alexander Thompson.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--The Ohio State University, 2010.
520 $a This dissertation seeks to explain why international investment agreements, despite being created with the same purposes and functions in mind, often display important variation in their degree of legalization. I posit that such variation exists because legalization creates a trade-off - between making credible commitments to foreign investors and retaining autonomous control over investment policies - that governments choose to resolve differently. Therefore, to explain the legalization of investment agreements, I develop a theory which explains how governments resolve the credibility-autonomy trade-off, leading them to conclude agreements with varying levels of legalization.
520 $a My core argument is that governments' willingness to submit to extensive constraints on their policy autonomy is shaped powerfully by their time horizons. Governments with long time horizons prize having greater autonomy to modify policies that shape the effect that foreign investment has on their economies in response to shifts in economic and political conditions that can occur over time. Governments with shorter time horizons, on the other hand, do not anticipate being in power long into the future and therefore are less concerned about maintaining greater policy freedom. Therefore, I hypothesize that when BITs are signed by governments with long time horizons, their level of legalization will be calibrated to promote greater policy autonomy than when they are concluded by governments with short time horizons. In addition, I argue that domestic political and institutional variables such as regime type, party institutionalization, and autocratic regime structure are critical in framing leaders' time horizons, and thus establish a theoretical link between domestic politics and the legalization of international investment institutions.
520 $a To evaluate my argument, I use original data on the design features of a random sample of 346 bilateral investment treaties (BITs). Using this data, I construct original measures of the degree of legalization with respect to its three dimensions - obligation, delegation and precision. Using quantitative methods of analysis, I find a robust relationship between the time horizons of governments and the degree of legalization of the BITs they conclude. Specifically, governments with long time horizons are more likely to conclude BITs at a level of legalization that promotes greater policy autonomy. In the case of obligation and precision, this holds with respect to net importers of dyadic FDI, and in the case of delegation, I find that the time horizons of net exporters display a statistically stronger relationship with legalization. These results hold across regime types and are robust to controlling for selection into BITs and a range of control variables.
590 $a School code: 0168.
650 4 $a Economics, Finance. $3 626650
650 4 $a Political Science, International Relations. $3 1669648
690 $a 0508
690 $a 0601
710 2 $a The Ohio State University. $b Political Science. $3 1675100
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 72-01A.
790 1 0 $a Thompson, Alexander, $e advisor
790 $a 0168
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2010
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3435708