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Failure to Catalyze: Why IMF-Support...

Racenberg, Molly Bauer.

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Failure to Catalyze: Why IMF-Supported Programs Fail to Promote Investment.

Record Type:	Language materials, printed : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Failure to Catalyze: Why IMF-Supported Programs Fail to Promote Investment./
Author:	Racenberg, Molly Bauer.
Description:	192 p.
Notes:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 72-05, Section: A, page: .
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International72-05A.
Subject:	Economics, General. -
Online resource:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3444745
ISBN:	9781124528755

Failure to Catalyze: Why IMF-Supported Programs Fail to Promote Investment.
Racenberg, Molly Bauer.

Failure to Catalyze: Why IMF-Supported Programs Fail to Promote Investment. - 192 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 72-05, Section: A, page: .

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of California, San Diego, 2011.

This dissertation examines the relationship between a country's involvement in an International Monetary Fund (IMF) facility and that country's ability to catalyze capital inflows. The IMF and policymakers tend to "take for granted" the catalytic effect of IMF lending (e.g. Schadler et al 1995; Bird and Rowlands 1997). However, with few exceptions, the empirical literature finds that Fund arrangements do not increase a participating country's access to private capital, and in fact more likely diminish the country's access to private capital. Why does there exist variation in the catalytic effect of Fund lending? This dissertation argues that the effect of IMF agreements on a country's access to private capital is dependent on whether or not investors believe the participatory country will implement the reforms tied to the IMF loan. International, facility, and domestic-level factors influence investor's expectations of implementation, thus influencing whether or not they will invest in the participatory country.

ISBN: 9781124528755Subjects--Topical Terms:

1017424
Economics, General.

Failure to Catalyze: Why IMF-Supported Programs Fail to Promote Investment.
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100 1 $a Racenberg, Molly Bauer. $3 1673932
245 1 0 $a Failure to Catalyze: Why IMF-Supported Programs Fail to Promote Investment.
300 $a 192 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 72-05, Section: A, page: .
500 $a Advisers: James Lawrence Broz; Branislav L. Slantchev.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of California, San Diego, 2011.
520 $a This dissertation examines the relationship between a country's involvement in an International Monetary Fund (IMF) facility and that country's ability to catalyze capital inflows. The IMF and policymakers tend to "take for granted" the catalytic effect of IMF lending (e.g. Schadler et al 1995; Bird and Rowlands 1997). However, with few exceptions, the empirical literature finds that Fund arrangements do not increase a participating country's access to private capital, and in fact more likely diminish the country's access to private capital. Why does there exist variation in the catalytic effect of Fund lending? This dissertation argues that the effect of IMF agreements on a country's access to private capital is dependent on whether or not investors believe the participatory country will implement the reforms tied to the IMF loan. International, facility, and domestic-level factors influence investor's expectations of implementation, thus influencing whether or not they will invest in the participatory country.
520 $a The theory is empirically tested using a Treatment Effects Model with a Markov Transition in the treatment equation in a dataset covering 142 countries between 1977 and 2008. Countries which sign IMF agreements experience an increase in portfolio investment, regardless of international, domestic and facility-level factors. However, countries which sign IMF agreements experience different levels of foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows, depending on, 1) whether they are of geopolitical strategic importance to powerful members of the IMF, 2) if they have signed a concessional loan, 3) the level of executive autonomy. The results supported the theory that investors do not view all IMF program equally and respond positively to those types of programs where implementation is more likely.
590 $a School code: 0033.
650 4 $a Economics, General. $3 1017424
650 4 $a Political Science, International Relations. $3 1669648
650 4 $a Political Science, General. $3 1017391
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710 2 $a University of California, San Diego. $b Political Science. $3 1027866
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 72-05A.
790 1 0 $a Broz, James Lawrence, $e advisor
790 1 0 $a Slantchev, Branislav L., $e advisor
790 1 0 $a Haggard, Stephan M. $e committee member
790 1 0 $a Malesky, Edmund J. $e committee member
790 1 0 $a Naoi, Megumi $e committee member
790 $a 0033
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2011
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3444745