東華大學圖書館 |

Language: English

Help

回圖書館首頁

手機版館藏查詢

Back

Switch To: Labeled | MARC Mode | ISBD

Essays on Industrial Organization an...

Ho, Justin Kai-Jen.

Linked to FindBook

Google Book

Amazon

博客來

Essays on Industrial Organization and Game Theory.

Record Type:	Language materials, printed : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Essays on Industrial Organization and Game Theory./
Author:	Ho, Justin Kai-Jen.
Description:	132 p.
Notes:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 71-07, Section: A, page: 2561.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International71-07A.
Subject:	Economics, General. -
Online resource:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3414757
ISBN:	9781124079561

Essays on Industrial Organization and Game Theory.
Ho, Justin Kai-Jen.

Essays on Industrial Organization and Game Theory. - 132 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 71-07, Section: A, page: 2561.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Harvard University, 2010.

This dissertation consists of three essays on Industrial Organization and Game Theory. The first chapter examines the effect of increased cash availability on cash inventories. Individuals incur a withdrawal cost from accessing their bank balances to re-stock their cash inventory for daily consumption needs. While larger cash inventories reduce the number of withdrawals a consumer makes from the bank, it comes at the cost of lost interest on bank balances. I estimate the benefit of new ATM and branch locations to consumers using individual panel data of withdrawals in the period 2002--2006 from a private bank in Vietnam. A rapid growth of available withdrawal locations reduces the non-monetary costs of making withdrawals for some individuals by nearly 50%. In equilibrium, agents adjust to these reduced costs by making slightly more frequent withdrawals and holding more bank inventory.

ISBN: 9781124079561Subjects--Topical Terms:

1017424
Economics, General.

Essays on Industrial Organization and Game Theory.
LDR:03263nam 2200313 4500 001 1393856
005 20110415112001.5
008 130515s2010 ||||||||||||||||| ||eng d
020 $a 9781124079561
035 $a (UMI)AAI3414757
035 $a AAI3414757
040 $a UMI $c UMI
100 1 $a Ho, Justin Kai-Jen. $3 1672435
245 1 0 $a Essays on Industrial Organization and Game Theory.
300 $a 132 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 71-07, Section: A, page: 2561.
500 $a Adviser: Julie Mortimer.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--Harvard University, 2010.
520 $a This dissertation consists of three essays on Industrial Organization and Game Theory. The first chapter examines the effect of increased cash availability on cash inventories. Individuals incur a withdrawal cost from accessing their bank balances to re-stock their cash inventory for daily consumption needs. While larger cash inventories reduce the number of withdrawals a consumer makes from the bank, it comes at the cost of lost interest on bank balances. I estimate the benefit of new ATM and branch locations to consumers using individual panel data of withdrawals in the period 2002--2006 from a private bank in Vietnam. A rapid growth of available withdrawal locations reduces the non-monetary costs of making withdrawals for some individuals by nearly 50%. In equilibrium, agents adjust to these reduced costs by making slightly more frequent withdrawals and holding more bank inventory.
520 $a The second chapter, co-authored with Julie Mortimer, Harvard University, and Katherine Ho, Columbia University, provides an empirical study of bundling in a supply chain, referred to as full-line forcing. We use an extensive dataset on contracts between video retailers and movie distributors to analyze the choices made on both sides of the market: which distributors offer full-line forcing contracts, which retailers take them up, and whether their decisions are profitable. Most large distributors offer full-line forcing contracts in our data. Our simulations indicate that their choices of which contracts to offer are profit-maximizing. However, many retailers prefer to utilize linear pricing contracts even when our model indicates that this may not be profit-maximizing.
520 $a The third chapter incorporates positive feedback reciprocity in a repeated moral hazard game In this environment, buyers observe feedback left for them before reporting feedback to the mechanism. Buyer feedback reports depend jointly on feedback received and the actual outcome of the transaction. Reciprocal preferences influence buyers and lead to inaccurate feedback reports that deviate from actual outcomes. Contrary to intuition, inaccurate feedback does not always harm equilibrium payoffs. If the feedback remains sufficiently informative, positive reciprocity increases the efficiency of the mechanism by reducing the amount of punishment that occurs in equilibrium.
590 $a School code: 0084.
650 4 $a Economics, General. $3 1017424
650 4 $a Economics, Theory. $3 1017575
650 4 $a Business Administration, Banking. $3 1018458
690 $a 0501
690 $a 0511
690 $a 0770
710 2 $a Harvard University. $3 528741
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 71-07A.
790 1 0 $a Mortimer, Julie, $e advisor
790 $a 0084
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2010
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3414757