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The political economy of antitrust

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	The political economy of antitrust/ edited by Johan Stennek.{me_controlnum}
other author:	Ghosal, Vivek.
Published:	Bingley, U.K. :Emerald, : 2007.,
Description:	1 online resource (xvi, 489 p.).
Notes:	Includes index.
[NT 15003449]:	Issues in antitrust enforcement / Johan Stennek -- Instruments for cartel deterrence, and conflicts of interests / Cécile Aubert -- Lessons for competition policy from the vitamins cartel /Matthew E. Raiff-- Effectiveness of antitrust sanctions on modern international cartels / John M. Connor -- The economics of tacit collusion : implications for merger control / Jean Tirole -- The economics and politics of international merger enforcement : a case study of the GE/Honeywell merger / Jay Pil Choi -- Remembrance of things past : antitrust, ideology, and the development of industrial economics / Stephen Martin -- The political economy of EU merger control : small vs. large member states / Johan Stennek -- A consumer surplus defense in merger control / Sven-Olof Fridolfsson -- EU merger remedies : an empirical assessment / Burcin Yurtoglu -- The significant impediment of effective competition test in the new European merger regulation : in theory and practice / Marc Ivaldi -- Vertical restraints and the effects of upstream horizontal mergers / Gregory J. Werden -- Political stabilization by an independent regulator / David Martimort -- Saving section 2 : reframing U.S. monopolizationlaw / Timothy J. Brennan -- Private antitrust litigation : procompetitive or anticompetitive? / Sue H. Mialon -- Antitrust in open economies / Henrik Horn -- The impact of the corporate leniency program on cartelformation and the cartel price path / Joseph E. Harrington Jr -- Optimal finesin the era of whistleblowers : should price fixers still go toprison? / Giancarlo Spagnolo.
Subject:	Business & Economics - Economics -
Online resource:	http://www.emeraldinsight.com/0573-8555/282
ISBN:	9781849508667 (electronic bk.)

The political economy of antitrust
The political economy of antitrust[electronic resource] /edited by Johan Stennek.{me_controlnum} - Bingley, U.K. :Emerald,2007. - 1 online resource (xvi, 489 p.). - Contributions to economic analysis,v. 2820573-8555 ;. - Contributions to economic analysis ;v. 210..

Includes index.

Issues in antitrust enforcement / Johan Stennek -- Instruments for cartel deterrence, and conflicts of interests / Cécile Aubert -- Lessons for competition policy from the vitamins cartel /Matthew E. Raiff-- Effectiveness of antitrust sanctions on modern international cartels / John M. Connor -- The economics of tacit collusion : implications for merger control / Jean Tirole -- The economics and politics of international merger enforcement : a case study of the GE/Honeywell merger / Jay Pil Choi -- Remembrance of things past : antitrust, ideology, and the development of industrial economics / Stephen Martin -- The political economy of EU merger control : small vs. large member states / Johan Stennek -- A consumer surplus defense in merger control / Sven-Olof Fridolfsson -- EU merger remedies : an empirical assessment / Burcin Yurtoglu -- The significant impediment of effective competition test in the new European merger regulation : in theory and practice / Marc Ivaldi -- Vertical restraints and the effects of upstream horizontal mergers / Gregory J. Werden -- Political stabilization by an independent regulator / David Martimort -- Saving section 2 : reframing U.S. monopolizationlaw / Timothy J. Brennan -- Private antitrust litigation : procompetitive or anticompetitive? / Sue H. Mialon -- Antitrust in open economies / Henrik Horn -- The impact of the corporate leniency program on cartelformation and the cartel price path / Joseph E. Harrington Jr -- Optimal finesin the era of whistleblowers : should price fixers still go toprison? / Giancarlo Spagnolo.

Motivated by recent events and experiences in antitrust enforcement and policy in the United States and the European Union, and new insights and findings from academic research, this book presents a collection of theoretical, empirical and public policy-oriented articles representing recent research on the political-economy of antitrust. Political-economy is defined broadly to include the demand-side drivers of antitrust activity such as market failures and interest-groups, along with supply-side drivers including ideology and partisan politics as well as theimportance of informational limitations in antitrust enforcement and the institutional structure of the antitrust agencies. Examining issues related to the political-economy of antitrust is important as antitrustpolicy and enforcement provide a key mechanism for preserving the competitiveness of markets, with implications for innovation, efficiency, growth and welfare. This book brings together contributions by leading academic researchers in the areas of political-economy, cartels, merger and non-merger enforcement, as well as economists working with antitrust authorities in the U.S. and E.U., to make a timely contribution for researchers and practitioners. The chapters in this volume cover the full range of topics: enforcement of cartels; merger control; monopolization and abuse of dominance; and systemic issues inantitrust enforcementand policy. Since the last few years have seen significant changes in both theU.S. and E.U. in the attitudes towards cartels, the book places emphasis on antitrust enforcement of cartels, including topics such as the corporate leniency programs that have recently been introduced inthe U.S. and E.U., optimal deterrence mechanisms against cartels and detection of cartels. While the individual chapters of the book make independent contributions and may be read separately, thebook brings together articles from various sub-areas to present a more encompassing picture. The first chapter provides an overview of some of the trends and recent research in antitrust enforcement and policy and highlights the contributions made by the chapters in this volume.

ISBN: 9781849508667 (electronic bk.)Subjects--Topical Terms:

1557245
Business & Economics
--Economics

LC Class. No.: HB171 / .P65 2007

Dewey Class. No.: 330

Universal Decimal Class. No.: 330

The political economy of antitrust
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520 $a Motivated by recent events and experiences in antitrust enforcement and policy in the United States and the European Union, and new insights and findings from academic research, this book presents a collection of theoretical, empirical and public policy-oriented articles representing recent research on the political-economy of antitrust. Political-economy is defined broadly to include the demand-side drivers of antitrust activity such as market failures and interest-groups, along with supply-side drivers including ideology and partisan politics as well as theimportance of informational limitations in antitrust enforcement and the institutional structure of the antitrust agencies. Examining issues related to the political-economy of antitrust is important as antitrustpolicy and enforcement provide a key mechanism for preserving the competitiveness of markets, with implications for innovation, efficiency, growth and welfare. This book brings together contributions by leading academic researchers in the areas of political-economy, cartels, merger and non-merger enforcement, as well as economists working with antitrust authorities in the U.S. and E.U., to make a timely contribution for researchers and practitioners. The chapters in this volume cover the full range of topics: enforcement of cartels; merger control; monopolization and abuse of dominance; and systemic issues inantitrust enforcementand policy. Since the last few years have seen significant changes in both theU.S. and E.U. in the attitudes towards cartels, the book places emphasis on antitrust enforcement of cartels, including topics such as the corporate leniency programs that have recently been introduced inthe U.S. and E.U., optimal deterrence mechanisms against cartels and detection of cartels. While the individual chapters of the book make independent contributions and may be read separately, thebook brings together articles from various sub-areas to present a more encompassing picture. The first chapter provides an overview of some of the trends and recent research in antitrust enforcement and policy and highlights the contributions made by the chapters in this volume.
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