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The political economy of court refor...

Bertelli, Anthony Michael.

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The political economy of court reform: Bargaining outcomes in structural reform litigation.

Record Type:	Language materials, printed : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	The political economy of court reform: Bargaining outcomes in structural reform litigation./
Author:	Bertelli, Anthony Michael.
Description:	210 p.
Notes:	Adviser: Laurence E. Lynn, Jr.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International62-07A.
Subject:	Law. -
Online resource:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3019892
ISBN:	0493311246

The political economy of court reform: Bargaining outcomes in structural reform litigation.
Bertelli, Anthony Michael.

The political economy of court reform: Bargaining outcomes in structural reform litigation. - 210 p.

Adviser: Laurence E. Lynn, Jr.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of Chicago, 2001.

Case studies examine the comparative statics and predictions of the bargaining model in the context of litigation against state and municipal child welfare agencies.

ISBN: 0493311246Subjects--Topical Terms:

600858
Law.

The political economy of court reform: Bargaining outcomes in structural reform litigation.
LDR:02029nam 2200313 a 45 001 931769
005 20110429
008 110429s2001 eng d
020 $a 0493311246
035 $a (UnM)AAI3019892
035 $a AAI3019892
040 $a UnM $c UnM
100 1 $a Bertelli, Anthony Michael. $3 814133
245 1 0 $a The political economy of court reform: Bargaining outcomes in structural reform litigation.
300 $a 210 p.
500 $a Adviser: Laurence E. Lynn, Jr.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 62-07, Section: A, page: 2565.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of Chicago, 2001.
520 $a Case studies examine the comparative statics and predictions of the bargaining model in the context of litigation against state and municipal child welfare agencies.
520 $a This is a theoretical and qualitative empirical inquiry into structural reform litigation: What it is, how it works, why it happens, and what are its potential effects on the operations of public agencies. Such litigation also has important implications for the management of defendant agencies, and those implications are examined.
520 $a Structural reform litigation is modeled as a bargaining process, and more specifically, a non-cooperative, alternating-offer bargaining game between plaintiff and agency. The model predicts certain properties of the agreement given alternative arrangements of litigant preferences and legal constraints. Analysis shows that courts are enlisted to effect change in service provision, record keeping, and other elements of a generalized “administrative effort.” Remedial orders mandate budgetary increases that are not necessarily approved by the legislature.
590 $a School code: 0330.
650 4 $a Law. $3 600858
650 4 $a Political Science, Public Administration. $3 1017438
650 4 $a Sociology, Public and Social Welfare. $3 1017909
690 $a 0398
690 $a 0617
690 $a 0630
710 2 0 $a The University of Chicago. $3 1017389
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 62-07A.
790 $a 0330
790 1 0 $a Lynn, Laurence E., Jr., $e advisor
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2001
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3019892