東華大學圖書館 |

The Epistemology of the Infinite /

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	The Epistemology of the Infinite // Patrick James Ryan.
作者:	Ryan, Patrick James,
面頁冊數:	1 electronic resource (228 pages)
附註:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 86-03, Section: B.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International86-03B.
標題:	Philosophy. -
電子資源:	https://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=31484677
ISBN:	9798384454939

The Epistemology of the Infinite /
Ryan, Patrick James,

The Epistemology of the Infinite /Patrick James Ryan. - 1 electronic resource (228 pages)

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 86-03, Section: B.

The great mathematician, physicist, and philosopher, Hermann Weyl, once called mathematics the "science of the infinite." This is a fitting title: contemporary mathematics-especially Cantorian set theory-provides us with marvelous ways of taming and clarifying the infinite. Nonetheless, I believe that the epistemic significance of mathematical infinity remains poorly understood. This dissertation investigates the role of the infinite in three diverse areas of study: number theory, cosmology, and probability theory. A discovery that emerges from my work is that the epistemic role of the infinite varies, often in surprising ways, across different domains of knowledge.My first chapter examines the role of mathematical infinity in number theory. It is reasonable to think that theorems concerning finite patterns and structures in the natural numbers are particularly "simple" or "elementary." Indeed, such statements are comprehensible to a wide range of investigators, regardless of their mathematical training. One might then expect proofs of these theorems to be similarly comprehensible. However, many proofs, especially those that utilize only finitary methods, are exceedingly difficult to understand. Consequently, one finds that finitary theorems are often re-proved using infinitary techniques. My claim is that this is because infinitary proofs are often explanatory, while finitary proofs are not. This chapter analyzes why this is the case. Along the way, I investigate other questions of long-standing interest in the philosophy of mathematics, e.g., the role of purity/impurity ascriptions and nature of the content of a theorem. In particular, I diagnose the explanatory potential of the infinite by articulating a new construal of content. This new construal both saves intuitive epistemic ascriptions made in mathematical practice and explains the unexpected role of the infinite in providing explanatory proofs of finitary statements. Thus, in number theory, my claim is that the infinite often plays an explanatory role.My second chapter turns to the role of the infinite in cosmology. It investigates a question much discussed by philosophers and physicists alike: is the spatial extent of the universe finite or infinite? Contemporary cosmological research has indicated that one of the essential determinants of the extent of the universe is the topology we ascribe to space. Topology is a global property, which may suggest that it is not testable through local observation. Nonetheless, some cosmologists have indicated that it may be empirically detected, thereby providing an answer to the question of spatial extent. I argue that, in fact, the epistemic status of the topology of space is extremely subtle and not well captured by any of the categories commonly employed by philosophers of science. In particular, I argue that topological properties are neither empirical nor a priori (even in suitably weakened senses). Furthermore, I claim that we should prefer topological properties that generate finite universe models (consistent with our best data) in order to avoid extremely thorny issues concerning the physics of an infinite universe. I argue for such a preference on the grounds of the simplicity and explanatory power of finite universe models. Thus, in cosmology, my claim is that the finite often plays an explanatory and simplifying role.My third chapter investigates several paradoxes that arise in the foundations of infinitary probability theory: the Label Invariance Paradox, God's Lottery, and Bertrand's Paradox. I argue that these have been poorly understood because they do not expressly concern probability theory, but rather our intuitions about-and formal techniques for dealing with- infinite sets. The paradoxes in question are, in fact, symptoms of our complete reliance upon Cantorian cardinality and its associated criterion of sameness of "size." That is, two sets have the same cardinality if and only if the elements of the sets can be placed in 1-1 correspondence. When applied to infinite sets, this criterion produces counterintuitive verdicts. For instance, given a fair lottery on the natural numbers, we expect that the probability of drawing an even number is 1/2, and likewise for drawing an odd number. However, one can construct "relabellings" of the naturals such that the probability of drawing an even number remains 1/2, while the probability for drawing an odd number becomes 1/4. I argue that, ultimately, it is the coarseness of Cantorian cardinality that generates the probabilistic paradoxes. I then propose that finer-grained measures of infinite sets from mathematical logic and number theory can help to dissolve the paradoxes in question. Thus, in probability theory, we find that particular kinds of infinitary techniques effectively systematize our theory, while others lead to paradox.

English

ISBN: 9798384454939Subjects--Topical Terms:

516511
Philosophy.
Subjects--Index Terms:

Cosmology

The Epistemology of the Infinite /
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520 $a The great mathematician, physicist, and philosopher, Hermann Weyl, once called mathematics the "science of the infinite." This is a fitting title: contemporary mathematics-especially Cantorian set theory-provides us with marvelous ways of taming and clarifying the infinite. Nonetheless, I believe that the epistemic significance of mathematical infinity remains poorly understood. This dissertation investigates the role of the infinite in three diverse areas of study: number theory, cosmology, and probability theory. A discovery that emerges from my work is that the epistemic role of the infinite varies, often in surprising ways, across different domains of knowledge.My first chapter examines the role of mathematical infinity in number theory. It is reasonable to think that theorems concerning finite patterns and structures in the natural numbers are particularly "simple" or "elementary." Indeed, such statements are comprehensible to a wide range of investigators, regardless of their mathematical training. One might then expect proofs of these theorems to be similarly comprehensible. However, many proofs, especially those that utilize only finitary methods, are exceedingly difficult to understand. Consequently, one finds that finitary theorems are often re-proved using infinitary techniques. My claim is that this is because infinitary proofs are often explanatory, while finitary proofs are not. This chapter analyzes why this is the case. Along the way, I investigate other questions of long-standing interest in the philosophy of mathematics, e.g., the role of purity/impurity ascriptions and nature of the content of a theorem. In particular, I diagnose the explanatory potential of the infinite by articulating a new construal of content. This new construal both saves intuitive epistemic ascriptions made in mathematical practice and explains the unexpected role of the infinite in providing explanatory proofs of finitary statements. Thus, in number theory, my claim is that the infinite often plays an explanatory role.My second chapter turns to the role of the infinite in cosmology. It investigates a question much discussed by philosophers and physicists alike: is the spatial extent of the universe finite or infinite? Contemporary cosmological research has indicated that one of the essential determinants of the extent of the universe is the topology we ascribe to space. Topology is a global property, which may suggest that it is not testable through local observation. Nonetheless, some cosmologists have indicated that it may be empirically detected, thereby providing an answer to the question of spatial extent. I argue that, in fact, the epistemic status of the topology of space is extremely subtle and not well captured by any of the categories commonly employed by philosophers of science. In particular, I argue that topological properties are neither empirical nor a priori (even in suitably weakened senses). Furthermore, I claim that we should prefer topological properties that generate finite universe models (consistent with our best data) in order to avoid extremely thorny issues concerning the physics of an infinite universe. I argue for such a preference on the grounds of the simplicity and explanatory power of finite universe models. Thus, in cosmology, my claim is that the finite often plays an explanatory and simplifying role.My third chapter investigates several paradoxes that arise in the foundations of infinitary probability theory: the Label Invariance Paradox, God's Lottery, and Bertrand's Paradox. I argue that these have been poorly understood because they do not expressly concern probability theory, but rather our intuitions about-and formal techniques for dealing with- infinite sets. The paradoxes in question are, in fact, symptoms of our complete reliance upon Cantorian cardinality and its associated criterion of sameness of "size." That is, two sets have the same cardinality if and only if the elements of the sets can be placed in 1-1 correspondence. When applied to infinite sets, this criterion produces counterintuitive verdicts. For instance, given a fair lottery on the natural numbers, we expect that the probability of drawing an even number is 1/2, and likewise for drawing an odd number. However, one can construct "relabellings" of the naturals such that the probability of drawing an even number remains 1/2, while the probability for drawing an odd number becomes 1/4. I argue that, ultimately, it is the coarseness of Cantorian cardinality that generates the probabilistic paradoxes. I then propose that finer-grained measures of infinite sets from mathematical logic and number theory can help to dissolve the paradoxes in question. Thus, in probability theory, we find that particular kinds of infinitary techniques effectively systematize our theory, while others lead to paradox.
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