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Information gap and unintended outco...

Deng, Fang,

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Information gap and unintended outcomes of social movements /

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Information gap and unintended outcomes of social movements // Fang Deng.
作者:	Deng, Fang,
面頁冊數:	1 electronic resource (204 pages)
附註:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 58-09, Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International58-09A.
標題:	Welfare. -
電子資源:	https://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=9618459
ISBN:	9798209388692

Information gap and unintended outcomes of social movements /
Deng, Fang,

Information gap and unintended outcomes of social movements /Fang Deng. - 1 electronic resource (204 pages)

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 58-09, Section: A.

What are conditions under which threats made by the state in the movement development are likely to hinder the movement or to fail in their objectives? What are conditions under which intended or unintended outcomes of social movements could occur? A theory of interaction between social movements and the state is constructed in this dissertation in order to answer these questions. Formalized in a game theoretical model, the theory yields specific hypotheses about the effects of private information hold by the state, which are illustrated by the 1989 Chinese student movement. In the theory, a two-level game usually constrains the state's choices after the emergence of social movements. Moves that are rational for the state at one game may be irrational for it at another game. As a result, the state has neither the inclination nor the means to disclose its preferences. Without complete information on the state's preferences pay-off structures between social movements and the state dramatically change, which induces demonstrators to resist. When a given game between social movements and the state is repeated, the demonstrators form their expectation of the strategies chosen by the state, on the one hand, and the options available to the state as function of the demonstrators' payoffs is getting less than before, on the other hand. The state sends a message of the private information about using force to the demonstrators before it starts to act. Unfortunately, there is an information gap between the demonstrators' expectation and the message. Based on the information gap the unintended outcomes of social movements become an inevitable result of rational interaction between social movements and the state.

English

ISBN: 9798209388692Subjects--Topical Terms:

3543853
Welfare.
Subjects--Index Terms:

Chinese student movement

Information gap and unintended outcomes of social movements /
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