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The Frame Problem: An Aristotelian/T...

Anderson, Timothy Reges,

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The Frame Problem: An Aristotelian/Thomistic Response /

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	The Frame Problem: An Aristotelian/Thomistic Response // Timothy Reges Anderson.
作者:	Anderson, Timothy Reges,
面頁冊數:	1 electronic resource (269 pages)
附註:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 86-11, Section: B.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International86-11B.
標題:	Philosophy. -
電子資源:	https://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=31939221
ISBN:	9798315758211

The Frame Problem: An Aristotelian/Thomistic Response /
Anderson, Timothy Reges,

The Frame Problem: An Aristotelian/Thomistic Response /Timothy Reges Anderson. - 1 electronic resource (269 pages)

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 86-11, Section: B.

The Frame Problem (TFP) is a long-standing problem in the field of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and cognitive science. It initially concerned the ability of a computer algorithm to determine both the effects and the non-effects of a proposed action. In the late 1960s it was discovered that without a strategy to avoid the recursive search of irrelevant branches of logical inference a planning algorithm might never terminate. As the search for such a strategy dragged on, however, AI researchers and others began wondering why humans do not face a similar impasse when planning ordinary actions.Responding to TFP, philosopher Hubert Dreyfus contended that TFP rested on false assumptions about human action. On Dreyfus's phenomenological view, ordinary human action does not involve logical inference but rather a prereflective "skilled coping." Any attempt to model human action with logical inference, Dreyfus predicted, was doomed to fail.In this study, I revise Dreyfus's response in a way that (a) retains the strengths of his phenomenological insight into TFP while (b) according human reason a more central role in human action than Dreyfus allows. The traditions of Aristotelian and Thomistic thought figure centrally in my revision.After laying out TFP and its history, I examine the phenomenological body of thought informing Dreyfus's response to TFP and to AI in general. I consider Dreyfus's intuition that embodiment is indispensable to humanlike intelligence by considering a similar argument made by Hans Jonas against cybernetics. For Jonas and contra Dreyfus, human rationality fulfills and even informs perception.Following Jonas's insight, I offer a novel response to TFP that restores reason to the center of human action. Drawing on recent Aristotelian essentialism, I ascribe some of the difficulty of TFP to its basis in modal essentialism. Turning to Thomistic psychology, I observe that the cogitative power allows for action that is spontaneous in the way Dreyfus describes but also pervaded by rationality. I examine the implications of the cogitative power for TFP by observing its role in the practical syllogism. I conclude by considering the implications of recent Large Language Model technologies for TFP.

English

ISBN: 9798315758211Subjects--Topical Terms:

516511
Philosophy.
Subjects--Index Terms:

Cogitative power

The Frame Problem: An Aristotelian/Thomistic Response /
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520 $a The Frame Problem (TFP) is a long-standing problem in the field of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and cognitive science. It initially concerned the ability of a computer algorithm to determine both the effects and the non-effects of a proposed action. In the late 1960s it was discovered that without a strategy to avoid the recursive search of irrelevant branches of logical inference a planning algorithm might never terminate. As the search for such a strategy dragged on, however, AI researchers and others began wondering why humans do not face a similar impasse when planning ordinary actions.Responding to TFP, philosopher Hubert Dreyfus contended that TFP rested on false assumptions about human action. On Dreyfus's phenomenological view, ordinary human action does not involve logical inference but rather a prereflective "skilled coping." Any attempt to model human action with logical inference, Dreyfus predicted, was doomed to fail.In this study, I revise Dreyfus's response in a way that (a) retains the strengths of his phenomenological insight into TFP while (b) according human reason a more central role in human action than Dreyfus allows. The traditions of Aristotelian and Thomistic thought figure centrally in my revision.After laying out TFP and its history, I examine the phenomenological body of thought informing Dreyfus's response to TFP and to AI in general. I consider Dreyfus's intuition that embodiment is indispensable to humanlike intelligence by considering a similar argument made by Hans Jonas against cybernetics. For Jonas and contra Dreyfus, human rationality fulfills and even informs perception.Following Jonas's insight, I offer a novel response to TFP that restores reason to the center of human action. Drawing on recent Aristotelian essentialism, I ascribe some of the difficulty of TFP to its basis in modal essentialism. Turning to Thomistic psychology, I observe that the cogitative power allows for action that is spontaneous in the way Dreyfus describes but also pervaded by rationality. I examine the implications of the cogitative power for TFP by observing its role in the practical syllogism. I conclude by considering the implications of recent Large Language Model technologies for TFP.
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