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New Separations and Beyond-Worst-Cas...

Zhao, Junyao,

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New Separations and Beyond-Worst-Case Analysis in Algorithmic Game Theory and Submodular Optimization /

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	New Separations and Beyond-Worst-Case Analysis in Algorithmic Game Theory and Submodular Optimization // Junyao Zhao.
作者:	Zhao, Junyao,
面頁冊數:	1 electronic resource (277 pages)
附註:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 86-04, Section: B.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International86-04B.
標題:	Auctions. -
電子資源:	https://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=31591794
ISBN:	9798342138512

New Separations and Beyond-Worst-Case Analysis in Algorithmic Game Theory and Submodular Optimization /
Zhao, Junyao,

New Separations and Beyond-Worst-Case Analysis in Algorithmic Game Theory and Submodular Optimization /Junyao Zhao. - 1 electronic resource (277 pages)

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 86-04, Section: B.

In algorithmic game theory, we analyze games and design mechanisms through computational lens. We prefer mechanisms that are simple, deterministic and incentive compatible because of their practicability. However, such mechanisms might obtain suboptimal value or require heavier computation compared to their counterparts without those restrictions. Part I of this thesis advances our understanding of the trade-off between simplicity/determinism/incentive compatibility and economic/computational efficiency by proving several near-tight separation results for central problems in algorithmic game theory such as optimal auction, contract design and social choice problem.In Part II of this thesis, we study various problems in algorithmic game theory and submodular optimization, such as cardinality-constrained submodular maximization, budget-feasible mechanism design and repeated first-price auction, under beyond-worst-case assumptions that model problem structure and user behavior in real-world applications; we investigate whether we can design algorithms/mechanisms/strategies with provably better performance than the best we can hope for in worst-case analysis.

English

ISBN: 9798342138512Subjects--Topical Terms:

778937
Auctions.

New Separations and Beyond-Worst-Case Analysis in Algorithmic Game Theory and Submodular Optimization /
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