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Essays on Information Transmission /

Aybas, Yunus Can,

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Essays on Information Transmission /

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Essays on Information Transmission // Yunus Can Aybas.
作者:	Aybas, Yunus Can,
面頁冊數:	1 electronic resource (187 pages)
附註:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 86-03, Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International86-03A.
標題:	Brownian motion. -
電子資源:	https://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=31324654
ISBN:	9798384198482

Essays on Information Transmission /
Aybas, Yunus Can,

Essays on Information Transmission /Yunus Can Aybas. - 1 electronic resource (187 pages)

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 86-03, Section: A.

This dissertation comprises three essays in information economics. The central focus of this work is to study how the structure of the informational environment impacts the transmission of information and the resultant effects on outcomes and welfare. The first chapter of this dissertation introduces a new framework for modeling strategic information transmission in complex environments. We identify an equilibrium that is efficient and sender-optimal. The outcome is exactly what the sender would choose if she held full decision-making authority. This contrasts with the canonical simple environment of Crawford and Sobel (1982) in which equilibrium outcomes are inefficient and favor the receiver. The second chapter explores how an expert's ability to persuade changes with the availability of messages. We develop a geometric representation of the expert's payoff when using a limited number of messages. We identify bounds on the value of an additional signal for the sender. Moreover, we show that an additional signal does not directly translate into more information in equilibrium, and the receiver might prefer coarse communication. This suggests that regulations on communication capacity have the potential to shift the balance of power from the expert to the decision-maker, ultimately improving welfare. The third chapter deviates from the preceding two by focusing on non-strategic communication. In this chapter, we introduce a model in which homophily affects both the quality and diversity of the information to which people have access in their social networks. We characterize conditions under which homophily hurts rather than helps social learning. Homophily lowers efficiency and increases inequality in sparse networks but enhances efficiency and decreases inequality in dense enough networks. We also show that optimal (learning-maximizing) networks exhibit assortativity in payoff-determining characteristics, which results in incidental homophily on other innate characteristics, providing an explanation for some empirical patterns.

English

ISBN: 9798384198482Subjects--Topical Terms:

3774160
Brownian motion.

Essays on Information Transmission /
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