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Moral and Affective Psychophysics: O...

Chituc, Vladimir,

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Moral and Affective Psychophysics: Or, How (Not) to Study Subjective Magnitude /

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Moral and Affective Psychophysics: Or, How (Not) to Study Subjective Magnitude // Vladimir Chituc.
作者:	Chituc, Vladimir,
面頁冊數:	1 electronic resource (117 pages)
附註:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 86-08, Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International86-08A.
標題:	Psychology. -
電子資源:	https://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=31560122
ISBN:	9798302881533

Moral and Affective Psychophysics: Or, How (Not) to Study Subjective Magnitude /
Chituc, Vladimir,

Moral and Affective Psychophysics: Or, How (Not) to Study Subjective Magnitude /Vladimir Chituc. - 1 electronic resource (117 pages)

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 86-08, Section: A.

People can feel more or less happy, hold opinions with more or less conviction, and find some criminal offenses to be more or less heinous. Though all of these examples concern something that is inherently subjective, it nonetheless seems as if each has a magnitude. Upon reflection, however, this raises two distinct puzzles, one practical and the other theoretical. Practically, how can we accurately measure these magnitudes, given their inherently subjective nature? And theoretically, magnitudes involve "more than" or "less than" judgments of quantity, but subjective stimuli provide no obvious answer to the question: "quantities of what?" So how can we say that subjective stimuli have a magnitude in the first place? This dissertation aims to answer these questions, and it does so by adapting methods and insights that were first developed to answer analogous questions about perceptual magnitudes. Across three case studies, I highlight and try to solve three salient problems involving labeled (e.g. Likert) scales: their interpersonal relativity (i.e. meaning different things to different people), their intrapersonal elasticity (i.e. meaning different things to the same person at different times), and their nonlinearity (i.e. compressing values in the upper range of the scale). In the first case study, I find that the interpersonal relativity of these scales can produce illusory differences in emotional intensity-suggesting, for example, that women experience anger more intensely than do men. In the second case study, I find that the intrapersonal elasticity of these scales produces absurd results in between-subjects experiments-showing, for example, that a particularly cruel prank seems just as immoral as (if not morally worse than) an internationally recognized war crime. And in my last case study, I find that the nonlinearity of these scales produces ratings that are a logarithmic compression of subjective moral magnitude, thus systematically underestimating moral judgment. In all three cases, I go on to demonstrate how each of these problems has a straightforward solution that can be easily adapted from work in sensory psychophysics. Collectively, these findings provide clear methodological lessons aimed toward improving psychological measurement, while also bearing on some of the most basic questions involving how the mind represents magnitude.

English

ISBN: 9798302881533Subjects--Topical Terms:

519075
Psychology.
Subjects--Index Terms:

Affective science

Moral and Affective Psychophysics: Or, How (Not) to Study Subjective Magnitude /
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520 $a People can feel more or less happy, hold opinions with more or less conviction, and find some criminal offenses to be more or less heinous. Though all of these examples concern something that is inherently subjective, it nonetheless seems as if each has a magnitude. Upon reflection, however, this raises two distinct puzzles, one practical and the other theoretical. Practically, how can we accurately measure these magnitudes, given their inherently subjective nature? And theoretically, magnitudes involve "more than" or "less than" judgments of quantity, but subjective stimuli provide no obvious answer to the question: "quantities of what?" So how can we say that subjective stimuli have a magnitude in the first place? This dissertation aims to answer these questions, and it does so by adapting methods and insights that were first developed to answer analogous questions about perceptual magnitudes. Across three case studies, I highlight and try to solve three salient problems involving labeled (e.g. Likert) scales: their interpersonal relativity (i.e. meaning different things to different people), their intrapersonal elasticity (i.e. meaning different things to the same person at different times), and their nonlinearity (i.e. compressing values in the upper range of the scale). In the first case study, I find that the interpersonal relativity of these scales can produce illusory differences in emotional intensity-suggesting, for example, that women experience anger more intensely than do men. In the second case study, I find that the intrapersonal elasticity of these scales produces absurd results in between-subjects experiments-showing, for example, that a particularly cruel prank seems just as immoral as (if not morally worse than) an internationally recognized war crime. And in my last case study, I find that the nonlinearity of these scales produces ratings that are a logarithmic compression of subjective moral magnitude, thus systematically underestimating moral judgment. In all three cases, I go on to demonstrate how each of these problems has a straightforward solution that can be easily adapted from work in sensory psychophysics. Collectively, these findings provide clear methodological lessons aimed toward improving psychological measurement, while also bearing on some of the most basic questions involving how the mind represents magnitude.
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