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Weapons of Discriminate Destruction:...

Williams, Robert Lowell, II,

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Weapons of Discriminate Destruction: Durability of Non-Use in the Third Nuclear Age /

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Weapons of Discriminate Destruction: Durability of Non-Use in the Third Nuclear Age // Robert Lowell Williams II.
作者:	Williams, Robert Lowell, II,
面頁冊數:	1 electronic resource (88 pages)
附註:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 86-06, Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International86-06A.
標題:	Military studies. -
電子資源:	https://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=31641073
ISBN:	9798346872740

Weapons of Discriminate Destruction: Durability of Non-Use in the Third Nuclear Age /
Williams, Robert Lowell, II,

Weapons of Discriminate Destruction: Durability of Non-Use in the Third Nuclear Age /Robert Lowell Williams II. - 1 electronic resource (88 pages)

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 86-06, Section: A.

The explanatory power of coercion theory and other legacy models that describe the role and value of nuclear weapons have been devalued in the present Third Nuclear Age. In contrast to the standard understanding that weaker states can be successfully targeted by either deterrence or compellence, and that their power to employ these same tools in shaping the behavior of greater powers is limited, the strong internalization of nuclear use as taboo among liberal democracies has shifted the utility of nuclear coercion to states with even nascent weapons programs. Like coercion theory, the utility of the stability-instability paradox has been largely voided by horizontal proliferation; nuclear symmetry in the classic dyadic relationship of the First Nuclear Age between the United States and the Soviet Union (or even two peer symmetry with Russia and China today) is an unsatisfying explanation for threats from nuclear-capable or -aspirant states that escalate conventional conflict in regional crises. Instead of reducing the role of nuclear weapons through reductions and global disarmament, as envisioned during the intervening Second Nuclear Age-when the collapse of the USSR gave hope for the end of major conflict-additional nuclear states began to emerge that were neither within the control of any superpower nor anywhere in the scope of symmetry to those established in the first era. That fallacious sparkle of hope for homeostasis in the international community around liberal democracy, which characterized the last three decades, was a veil for a complete paradigm shift underfoot in how nuclear weapons might incentivize limited powers to gain concessions through compellence and build strong deterrence of their own. A case study of North Korea's nuclear development, from being the subject of nuclear threats during 1950-53 through decades of coercion by a nuclear power, is presented as evidence of this shifting role and a rejection of global internalization of nuclear use as taboo. The key findings of this paper extend, however, beyond Pyongyang and are generalized to a new utility for states that may possess only a single nuclear weapon.

English

ISBN: 9798346872740Subjects--Topical Terms:

2197382
Military studies.
Subjects--Index Terms:

Coercion

Weapons of Discriminate Destruction: Durability of Non-Use in the Third Nuclear Age /
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520 $a The explanatory power of coercion theory and other legacy models that describe the role and value of nuclear weapons have been devalued in the present Third Nuclear Age. In contrast to the standard understanding that weaker states can be successfully targeted by either deterrence or compellence, and that their power to employ these same tools in shaping the behavior of greater powers is limited, the strong internalization of nuclear use as taboo among liberal democracies has shifted the utility of nuclear coercion to states with even nascent weapons programs. Like coercion theory, the utility of the stability-instability paradox has been largely voided by horizontal proliferation; nuclear symmetry in the classic dyadic relationship of the First Nuclear Age between the United States and the Soviet Union (or even two peer symmetry with Russia and China today) is an unsatisfying explanation for threats from nuclear-capable or -aspirant states that escalate conventional conflict in regional crises. Instead of reducing the role of nuclear weapons through reductions and global disarmament, as envisioned during the intervening Second Nuclear Age-when the collapse of the USSR gave hope for the end of major conflict-additional nuclear states began to emerge that were neither within the control of any superpower nor anywhere in the scope of symmetry to those established in the first era. That fallacious sparkle of hope for homeostasis in the international community around liberal democracy, which characterized the last three decades, was a veil for a complete paradigm shift underfoot in how nuclear weapons might incentivize limited powers to gain concessions through compellence and build strong deterrence of their own. A case study of North Korea's nuclear development, from being the subject of nuclear threats during 1950-53 through decades of coercion by a nuclear power, is presented as evidence of this shifting role and a rejection of global internalization of nuclear use as taboo. The key findings of this paper extend, however, beyond Pyongyang and are generalized to a new utility for states that may possess only a single nuclear weapon.
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