東華大學圖書館 |

語系: 繁體中文

說明(常見問題)

回圖書館首頁

手機版館藏查詢

登入

回首頁 到查詢結果 [ null ]

切換: 標籤 | MARC模式 | ISBD

Military Rule and Military Industry:...

Liang, Xiaodon Leon,

FindBook

Google Book

Amazon

博客來

Military Rule and Military Industry: Prerogatives and Interests /

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Military Rule and Military Industry: Prerogatives and Interests // Xiaodon Leon Liang.
作者:	Liang, Xiaodon Leon,
面頁冊數:	1 electronic resource (458 pages)
附註:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 85-09, Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International85-09A.
標題:	Political science. -
電子資源:	https://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=30633730
ISBN:	9798381806601

Military Rule and Military Industry: Prerogatives and Interests /
Liang, Xiaodon Leon,

Military Rule and Military Industry: Prerogatives and Interests /Xiaodon Leon Liang. - 1 electronic resource (458 pages)

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 85-09, Section: A.

Variance in arms procurement policies across developing states cannot be fully explained in terms of economic capacity or external threat. This dissertation argues that civil-military relations affect the type of arms procurement policies that states adopt. The balance of civil-military prerogatives and responsibilities affects whether firepower-maximizing or economy-building incentives drive outcomes. States in which arms procurement policy and economic development policy are the responsibility of the same decision-making group-whether that group is composed of a civilian cabinet or a military junta-will be more likely to promote arms production, while a split in responsibilities leads to weak support for arms production. This dissertation integrates the existing literature on arms production determinants into a two-variable model, hypothesizing that, in addition to the firepower-economy trade-off, arms procurement policies are also partially determined by whether states are autonomy- or relationship-seeking in their foreign policy. To support this novel theory, I conduct a statistical analysis of country-level panel time-series data as well as three country case studies. These case studies, covering India, Argentina, and Taiwan, draw on memoirs and archival documents in addition to the secondary literature. By tracing causal mechanisms, the case studies consistently verify key assumptions and expectations of the novel theory. The statistical analysis produces moderate support for the external validity of the argument.

English

ISBN: 9798381806601Subjects--Topical Terms:

528916
Political science.
Subjects--Index Terms:

Arms procurement

Military Rule and Military Industry: Prerogatives and Interests /
LDR:03003nmm a22004333i 4500 001 2430442
005 20250527055020.5
006 m o d
007 cr|nu||||||||
008 261011s2023 miu||||||m |||||||eng d
020 $a 9798381806601
035 $a (MiAaPQD)AAI30633730
035 $a AAI30633730
040 $a MiAaPQD $b eng $c MiAaPQD $e rda
100 1 $a Liang, Xiaodon Leon, $e author. $3 3818762
245 1 0 $a Military Rule and Military Industry: Prerogatives and Interests / $c Xiaodon Leon Liang.
264 1 $a Ann Arbor : $b ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, $c 2023
300 $a 1 electronic resource (458 pages)
336 $a text $b txt $2 rdacontent
337 $a computer $b c $2 rdamedia
338 $a online resource $b cr $2 rdacarrier
500 $a Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 85-09, Section: A.
500 $a Advisors: Drezner, Daniel Committee members: Toft, Monica; Caverley, Jonathan.
502 $b Ph.D. $c Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy (Tufts University) $d 2023.
520 $a Variance in arms procurement policies across developing states cannot be fully explained in terms of economic capacity or external threat. This dissertation argues that civil-military relations affect the type of arms procurement policies that states adopt. The balance of civil-military prerogatives and responsibilities affects whether firepower-maximizing or economy-building incentives drive outcomes. States in which arms procurement policy and economic development policy are the responsibility of the same decision-making group-whether that group is composed of a civilian cabinet or a military junta-will be more likely to promote arms production, while a split in responsibilities leads to weak support for arms production. This dissertation integrates the existing literature on arms production determinants into a two-variable model, hypothesizing that, in addition to the firepower-economy trade-off, arms procurement policies are also partially determined by whether states are autonomy- or relationship-seeking in their foreign policy. To support this novel theory, I conduct a statistical analysis of country-level panel time-series data as well as three country case studies. These case studies, covering India, Argentina, and Taiwan, draw on memoirs and archival documents in addition to the secondary literature. By tracing causal mechanisms, the case studies consistently verify key assumptions and expectations of the novel theory. The statistical analysis produces moderate support for the external validity of the argument.
546 $a English
590 $a School code: 0930
650 4 $a Political science. $3 528916
650 4 $a Military studies. $3 2197382
653 $a Arms procurement
653 $a Arms production
653 $a Civil-military relations
653 $a Military industry
653 $a Military rule
690 $a 0601
690 $a 0615
690 $a 0750
710 2 $a Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy (Tufts University). $b Diplomacy, History, and Politics. $e degree granting institution. $3 3818763
720 1 $a Drezner, Daniel $e degree supervisor.
773 0 $t Dissertations Abstracts International $g 85-09A.
790 $a 0930
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2023
856 4 0 $u https://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=30633730