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The political commissar system in the military : = A comparison of two Chinese armies.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	The political commissar system in the military :/
其他題名:	A comparison of two Chinese armies.
作者:	Cheng, Hsiao-shih.
面頁冊數:	1 online resource (399 pages)
附註:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 50-07, Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International50-07A.
標題:	Political science. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=8823980click for full text (PQDT)
ISBN:	9798206783810

The political commissar system in the military : = A comparison of two Chinese armies.
Cheng, Hsiao-shih.

The political commissar system in the military :A comparison of two Chinese armies. - 1 online resource (399 pages)

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 50-07, Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--State University of New York at Buffalo, 1988.

Includes bibliographical references

The Political Commissar System (PCS) in the military of the party-state political system was commonly viewed by Western scholars as an institution designed to buttress civilian elites' control over the military, i.e., to prevent coups d'etat and expanded political roles for the military. This is the central thesis of the "party control" model, traditionally employed by scholars to study civil-military relations in party-states. This model, in turn, is based on the more broadly-conceived theoretical framework, the "civilian control" paradigm, which has dominated Western studies of civil-military relations for decades. This study challenges both the "party control" model and the "civilian control" paradigm by comparing the PCS's origins, structures and functions, institutional rationales, and political roles in two Chinese Armies, the People's Liberation Army of the People's Republic of China and the Army of the Republic of China. From the comparison of these two cases, this author argues that the nature of the PCS cannot be fully understood unless it is divided into the party work system and the political work system. The party work system is basically political in nature, intended to buttress party (not civilian) leadership. The political work system, on the other hand, is in fact military, designed to promote military effectiveness through, among other things, establishing good civil-military relations. Similar kinds of political work systems exist in the militaries of non-party-states as well, while party work systems may have counterparts in the militaries of non-party-states. Contrary to the conventional wisdom that the PCS is a tool for civilian control and that it obstructs military effectiveness and stifles military professionalism, this research finds that it actually tends to promote the military's participation in politics, contribute to military effectiveness, and broaden the traditional concept of "professionalism." Therefore, the phenomenon that successful military coups have not occurred in all party-states cannot be explained in terms of the PCS's effective control of the military. The basic assumptions and value premises of the civilian control paradigm, such as civilian/military dichotomy and civilian supremacy, are thereby questioned.

Electronic reproduction.
Ann Arbor, Mich. :
ProQuest,
2023

Mode of access: World Wide Web

ISBN: 9798206783810Subjects--Topical Terms:

528916
Political science.
Index Terms--Genre/Form:

542853
Electronic books.

The political commissar system in the military : = A comparison of two Chinese armies.
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504 $a Includes bibliographical references
520 $a The Political Commissar System (PCS) in the military of the party-state political system was commonly viewed by Western scholars as an institution designed to buttress civilian elites' control over the military, i.e., to prevent coups d'etat and expanded political roles for the military. This is the central thesis of the "party control" model, traditionally employed by scholars to study civil-military relations in party-states. This model, in turn, is based on the more broadly-conceived theoretical framework, the "civilian control" paradigm, which has dominated Western studies of civil-military relations for decades. This study challenges both the "party control" model and the "civilian control" paradigm by comparing the PCS's origins, structures and functions, institutional rationales, and political roles in two Chinese Armies, the People's Liberation Army of the People's Republic of China and the Army of the Republic of China. From the comparison of these two cases, this author argues that the nature of the PCS cannot be fully understood unless it is divided into the party work system and the political work system. The party work system is basically political in nature, intended to buttress party (not civilian) leadership. The political work system, on the other hand, is in fact military, designed to promote military effectiveness through, among other things, establishing good civil-military relations. Similar kinds of political work systems exist in the militaries of non-party-states as well, while party work systems may have counterparts in the militaries of non-party-states. Contrary to the conventional wisdom that the PCS is a tool for civilian control and that it obstructs military effectiveness and stifles military professionalism, this research finds that it actually tends to promote the military's participation in politics, contribute to military effectiveness, and broaden the traditional concept of "professionalism." Therefore, the phenomenon that successful military coups have not occurred in all party-states cannot be explained in terms of the PCS's effective control of the military. The basic assumptions and value premises of the civilian control paradigm, such as civilian/military dichotomy and civilian supremacy, are thereby questioned.
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