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Mechanism Design for Variants of Advertising Auction and Facility Location.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Mechanism Design for Variants of Advertising Auction and Facility Location./
作者:	Li, Weian.
出版者:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 2021,
面頁冊數:	104 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 83-11, Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International83-11A.
標題:	Sparsity. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=29057126
ISBN:	9798426864948

Mechanism Design for Variants of Advertising Auction and Facility Location.
Li, Weian.

Mechanism Design for Variants of Advertising Auction and Facility Location. - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2021 - 104 p.

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 83-11, Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Hong Kong University of Science and Technology (Hong Kong), 2021.

This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.

In this thesis, we concentrate on two hot topics, advertising auction (belongs to the scope of mechanisms with monetary transfer) and facility location (belongs to the scope of mechanisms without money). In each topic, aiming to achieve multiple goals, we workon designing the optimal (approximate) mechanisms and compare the simple mechanismswith the optimal mechanism.In the first work, we focus on the advertising auction. Advertising becomes one of the most popular ways of monetizing an online transaction platform. Usually, sponsoredadvertisements are posted on the most attractive positions to enhance the number ofclicks. However, multiple e-commerce platforms are aware that this action may hurtthe search experience of users, even though it can bring more incomes. To balance theadvertising revenue and the user experience loss caused by advertisements, different fromthese common rules of treating the allocation of ads separately (from the arrangementsof the organic searched items), in this work we build up an integrated system with mixedarrangements of advertisements and organic items. We focus on the design of truthfulmechanisms to properly list the advertisements and organic items and optimally trade off the instant revenue and the user experience. Furthermore, for different settings andpractical requirements, we extend our optimal truthful allocation mechanisms to cater forthese realistic conditions. Finally, with the aid of the real data, our experimental resultsverify the good performance of our mechanismsIn the second work, we focus on a canonical Bayesian mechanism design setting: aseller wants to sell a single item to n bidders, whose values are drawn i.i.d. from a monotone-hazard-rate distribution. In the literature, three mechanisms receive particularattention: the revenue-optimal mechanism Myerson Auction (OPT), the welfare-optimal mechanism Second-Price Auction (SPA), and the most widely-used mechanism AnonymousPricing (AP). In terms of revenue, we investigate how well the later two mechanisms canapproximate Myerson Auction. OPT vs. AP: over all n ∈ N ≥1, the supremum ratio is 1.27,and the worst-case distribution is exponential-like. OPT vs. SPA: for each n ≥ 2, thisratio is upper-bounded by (1 - (1 - 1/e)n - 1)-1 = 1 + 2-O(n); an asymptotically matchinglower bound can be reached by a truncated exponential distribution.The third work studies the topic of facility location. In this work, we study a newmodel where one or two facilities are to be located in a plaza to serve nearby residents.The plaza is geometrically modeled as a square, crossing which located a street. A numberof residents (agents) live on this street with actual positions being their private information.Our goal is to design strategyproof mechanisms to elicit the agents' true positionsand decide the locations to build facilities such that the social welfare is (approximately)maximized. We study several settings, where the facilities can be favorable or obnoxious,and the agents' distance metrics can be Manhattan or Euclidean. Interestingly, for Manhattandistances, all of our mechanisms achieve the optimal algorithmic social welfare.For Euclidean distances, however, we prove that the optimal algorithms are not strategyproof.Accordingly, for each model we design strategyproof mechanisms that guaranteeconstant approximations of the optimal social welfare.

ISBN: 9798426864948Subjects--Topical Terms:

3680690
Sparsity.

Mechanism Design for Variants of Advertising Auction and Facility Location.
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