東華大學圖書館 |

語系: 繁體中文

說明(常見問題)

回圖書館首頁

手機版館藏查詢

登入

回首頁 到查詢結果 [ null ]

切換: 標籤 | MARC模式 | ISBD

FindBook

Google Book

Amazon

博客來

Defense against Micro-Architecture Level Transient Execution Based Attacks via Program Analysis.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Defense against Micro-Architecture Level Transient Execution Based Attacks via Program Analysis./
作者:	Guanhua, Wang.
出版者:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 2020,
面頁冊數:	144 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 83-05, Section: B.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International83-05B.
標題:	Behavior. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=28832600
ISBN:	9798460444151

Defense against Micro-Architecture Level Transient Execution Based Attacks via Program Analysis.
Guanhua, Wang.

Defense against Micro-Architecture Level Transient Execution Based Attacks via Program Analysis. - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2020 - 144 p.

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 83-05, Section: B.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--National University of Singapore (Singapore), 2020.

This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.

Modern processors rely on micro-architectural optimizations predicting or re-ordering the instruction stream to improve performance. These optimizations may introduce security issues in the intermediate state of the execution (transient execution). A key insight into these vulnerabilities is that transient execution in processors can be misused to access secrets. Theoretically, program analysis can verify whether a program is vulnerable to transient execution-based attacks. However, the traditional program analysis does not consider this hardware mechanism. To address this issue, in this dissertation, we focus on novel program analysis methods to explore the potential vulnerabilities related to transient execution. First, we propose a static analysis to check whether a given program binary is vulnerable to Spectre attack. Then, to engage the speculative execution and cache modelling into the traditional symbolic execution, we propose KLEESpectre. Finally, we present a tool called Efuzz to prevent the timing-driven cache side-channel attacks.

ISBN: 9798460444151Subjects--Topical Terms:

532476
Behavior.
Subjects--Index Terms:

Cyber security

Defense against Micro-Architecture Level Transient Execution Based Attacks via Program Analysis.
LDR:02346nmm a2200373 4500 001 2348092
005 20220906075203.5
008 241004s2020 ||||||||||||||||| ||eng d
020 $a 9798460444151
035 $a (MiAaPQ)AAI28832600
035 $a (MiAaPQ)USingapore188073
035 $a AAI28832600
040 $a MiAaPQ $c MiAaPQ
100 1 $a Guanhua, Wang. $3 3687412
245 1 0 $a Defense against Micro-Architecture Level Transient Execution Based Attacks via Program Analysis.
260 1 $a Ann Arbor : $b ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, $c 2020
300 $a 144 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 83-05, Section: B.
500 $a Advisor: Mitra, Tulika;Roychoudhury, Abhik.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--National University of Singapore (Singapore), 2020.
506 $a This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.
506 $a This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.
520 $a Modern processors rely on micro-architectural optimizations predicting or re-ordering the instruction stream to improve performance. These optimizations may introduce security issues in the intermediate state of the execution (transient execution). A key insight into these vulnerabilities is that transient execution in processors can be misused to access secrets. Theoretically, program analysis can verify whether a program is vulnerable to transient execution-based attacks. However, the traditional program analysis does not consider this hardware mechanism. To address this issue, in this dissertation, we focus on novel program analysis methods to explore the potential vulnerabilities related to transient execution. First, we propose a static analysis to check whether a given program binary is vulnerable to Spectre attack. Then, to engage the speculative execution and cache modelling into the traditional symbolic execution, we propose KLEESpectre. Finally, we present a tool called Efuzz to prevent the timing-driven cache side-channel attacks.
590 $a School code: 1883.
650 4 $a Behavior. $3 532476
650 4 $a C plus plus. $3 3687413
650 4 $a Optimization techniques. $3 3681622
650 4 $a Mutation. $3 837917
650 4 $a Algorithms. $3 536374
650 4 $a Performance evaluation. $3 3562292
650 4 $a Software engineering. $3 559826
650 4 $a Entropy. $3 546219
650 4 $a Computer science. $3 523869
650 4 $a Engineering. $3 586835
650 4 $a Information science. $3 554358
653 $a Cyber security
653 $a Timing-driven cache side-channel attacks
653 $a Spectre attack
690 $a 0984
690 $a 0537
690 $a 0723
710 2 $a National University of Singapore (Singapore). $3 3352228
773 0 $t Dissertations Abstracts International $g 83-05B.
790 $a 1883
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2020
793 $a English
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=28832600