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The Political Effects on Corporate Financial Fraud: Evidence from China.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	The Political Effects on Corporate Financial Fraud: Evidence from China./
作者:	Gong, Ke.
出版者:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 2021,
面頁冊數:	87 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 83-03, Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International83-03A.
標題:	Ethics. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=28321516
ISBN:	9798544277101

The Political Effects on Corporate Financial Fraud: Evidence from China.
Gong, Ke.

The Political Effects on Corporate Financial Fraud: Evidence from China. - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2021 - 87 p.

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 83-03, Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Iowa State University, 2021.

This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.

Why does corporate financial fraud in China remain prevalent after the aggressive anti-corruption campaign that began in 2012? To explore this phenomenon, this study examines how the political factors embedded in China's Regionally Decentralized Authoritarian system affect the commission and detection of financial fraud. Synthesizing the political mechanisms behind regulators' selective enforcement behavior and managers' financial fraud activity, I demonstrate that four critical political factors--provincial officials' factional affiliation and retirement, social unrest, and an industry's national prominence--affect fraud commission and fraud detection in opposing directions. I employ a bivariate probit model to separately test the political effects on fraud commission and fraud detection. The findings show that regulators reduce enforcement while managers commit more fraud when provincial leaders have a factional affiliation with the national president. On the contrary, regulators strengthen enforcement, and managers commit less fraud when provincial leaders are close to retiring, local social unrest becomes intense, and when firms are in state-supported industries. This study contributes to understanding the political drivers of corruption by offering a framework that combines the mechanisms behind regulators' enforcement behavior and managers' misconduct. It also extends the knowledge of the government's influence on managerial behavior, facilitates the application of the bivariate probit approach in management studies, and provides practical insights for policymakers, investors, and due diligence-based equity research firms in combating financial fraud.

ISBN: 9798544277101Subjects--Topical Terms:

517264
Ethics.
Subjects--Index Terms:

Corporate financial fraud

The Political Effects on Corporate Financial Fraud: Evidence from China.
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500 $a Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 83-03, Section: A.
500 $a Advisor: Johnson, Scott.
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520 $a Why does corporate financial fraud in China remain prevalent after the aggressive anti-corruption campaign that began in 2012? To explore this phenomenon, this study examines how the political factors embedded in China's Regionally Decentralized Authoritarian system affect the commission and detection of financial fraud. Synthesizing the political mechanisms behind regulators' selective enforcement behavior and managers' financial fraud activity, I demonstrate that four critical political factors--provincial officials' factional affiliation and retirement, social unrest, and an industry's national prominence--affect fraud commission and fraud detection in opposing directions. I employ a bivariate probit model to separately test the political effects on fraud commission and fraud detection. The findings show that regulators reduce enforcement while managers commit more fraud when provincial leaders have a factional affiliation with the national president. On the contrary, regulators strengthen enforcement, and managers commit less fraud when provincial leaders are close to retiring, local social unrest becomes intense, and when firms are in state-supported industries. This study contributes to understanding the political drivers of corruption by offering a framework that combines the mechanisms behind regulators' enforcement behavior and managers' misconduct. It also extends the knowledge of the government's influence on managerial behavior, facilitates the application of the bivariate probit approach in management studies, and provides practical insights for policymakers, investors, and due diligence-based equity research firms in combating financial fraud.
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650 4 $a Public administration. $3 531287
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650 4 $a Asian studies. $3 1571829
650 4 $a Criminology. $3 533274
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653 $a Corruption
653 $a Firm misconduct
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653 $a Selective law enforcement
653 $a China
653 $a Fraud commission
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