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Bernard Fall and Vietnamese Revoluti...

Moir, Nathaniel L.

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Bernard Fall and Vietnamese Revolutionary Warfare in Indochina.

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Bernard Fall and Vietnamese Revolutionary Warfare in Indochina./
Author:	Moir, Nathaniel L.
Published:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 2019,
Description:	423 p.
Notes:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 81-02, Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International81-02A.
Subject:	International relations. -
Online resource:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=13864995
ISBN:	9781085590655

Bernard Fall and Vietnamese Revolutionary Warfare in Indochina.
Moir, Nathaniel L.

Bernard Fall and Vietnamese Revolutionary Warfare in Indochina. - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2019 - 423 p.

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 81-02, Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--State University of New York at Albany, 2019.

This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.

What accounts for Bernard Fall's understanding and description of Vietnamese Revolutionary Warfare in Indochina? How did formative experiences during and after the Second World War actuate Fall's thought on the political nature of warfare in Indochina? What distinguished Fall's thought on revolutionary warfare from others? Bernard Fall and Vietnamese Revolutionary Warfare in Indochina addresses these questions through an intellectual history and contextual biography of Bernard Fall's scholarship on the First and Second Indochina Wars. Bernard Fall, an authority on Vietnamese history, society, and the First Indochina War, began to explain in 1957 that subsequent war in Vietnam could not be won through military means because political legitimacy could not be achieved through intervention. War in Vietnam was a political and social conflict and Vietnamese communists used Revolutionary Warfare to succeed. The only effective response to this form of politically-oriented warfare was wide-spread acceptance of the Republic of Vietnam's legitimacy among a majority of Vietnamese. As Fall knew, and as became increasingly evident in the later 1950s, the Republic's legitimacy could not compete adequately with that of the Viet Minh and its government, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. Bernard Fall and Vietnamese Revolutionary Warfare in Indochina describes how Fall identified and described the Viet Minh's efforts to undermine its competitors' legitimacy, and that of its ally, the United States, towards the attainment of its goal of political victory.The United States, Fall argued, did not understand the war in which it was engaged. He described this in a letter to John Paul Vann in early 1965, writing "Everybody speaks the platitude that the war will have to be won on the terrain and among the SVN people - and then goes on right back to one more pass with M-113's and napalm." Fall's focus on legitimacy of governance grounded his argument that war in Indochina was a political and social revolution in which overly militarized intervention narrowed foreign policy options. He sought to utilize what he learned of the Viet Minh's war against the French and the Associated State of Vietnam and apply that history and knowledge to his critiques of the United States' foreign policy in the early stages of the Second Indochina War. Earlier, the Viet Minh had successfully subverted French authority and dominated local Vietnamese governance in northern areas of Vietnam. Fall recognized that their successors, the National Liberation Front, adopted similar methods of political subversion over open-conventional war against the United States. This led Fall to recognize the importance of political processes of governance that were often unmeasurable by military-oriented parameters, writing "When a country is being subverted it is not being outfought; it is being out-administered." Fall studied war by studying the political administration of it, not just how it unfolded through militarized mechanisms of power.Fall was a dedicated anti-communist but he believed that the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) did not pose a geostrategic or national security threat to the United States. He attempted to explain the historically strained relationship between Vietnam and China and that DRV leadership was as fearful of Chinese encroachment as it was of France's return to Indochina after World War II. The importance of Vietnamese history, a major point of emphasis for Fall in his scholarship, was not heeded when it could have made a difference among American foreign policy-makers. Applying his knowledge of France's recent history in Indochina, he described how the United States would also face an insurmountable task should it engage in an overmilitarized intervention. Yet, because of his public criticism of foreign policy, he was surveilled by the FBI and blocked from employment at the Royal Institute in Phenom Penh by the U.S. State Department in 1958. This event, stemming from an article Fall published in May 1958, compelled Fall to find other non-government channels to research and write about the onset of the Second Indochina War in late 1958 and 1959.

ISBN: 9781085590655Subjects--Topical Terms:

531762
International relations.
Subjects--Index Terms:

Fall, Bernard

Bernard Fall and Vietnamese Revolutionary Warfare in Indochina.
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245 1 0 $a Bernard Fall and Vietnamese Revolutionary Warfare in Indochina.
260 1 $a Ann Arbor : $b ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, $c 2019
300 $a 423 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 81-02, Section: A.
500 $a Advisor: Fogarty, Richard S.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--State University of New York at Albany, 2019.
506 $a This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.
520 $a What accounts for Bernard Fall's understanding and description of Vietnamese Revolutionary Warfare in Indochina? How did formative experiences during and after the Second World War actuate Fall's thought on the political nature of warfare in Indochina? What distinguished Fall's thought on revolutionary warfare from others? Bernard Fall and Vietnamese Revolutionary Warfare in Indochina addresses these questions through an intellectual history and contextual biography of Bernard Fall's scholarship on the First and Second Indochina Wars. Bernard Fall, an authority on Vietnamese history, society, and the First Indochina War, began to explain in 1957 that subsequent war in Vietnam could not be won through military means because political legitimacy could not be achieved through intervention. War in Vietnam was a political and social conflict and Vietnamese communists used Revolutionary Warfare to succeed. The only effective response to this form of politically-oriented warfare was wide-spread acceptance of the Republic of Vietnam's legitimacy among a majority of Vietnamese. As Fall knew, and as became increasingly evident in the later 1950s, the Republic's legitimacy could not compete adequately with that of the Viet Minh and its government, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. Bernard Fall and Vietnamese Revolutionary Warfare in Indochina describes how Fall identified and described the Viet Minh's efforts to undermine its competitors' legitimacy, and that of its ally, the United States, towards the attainment of its goal of political victory.The United States, Fall argued, did not understand the war in which it was engaged. He described this in a letter to John Paul Vann in early 1965, writing "Everybody speaks the platitude that the war will have to be won on the terrain and among the SVN people - and then goes on right back to one more pass with M-113's and napalm." Fall's focus on legitimacy of governance grounded his argument that war in Indochina was a political and social revolution in which overly militarized intervention narrowed foreign policy options. He sought to utilize what he learned of the Viet Minh's war against the French and the Associated State of Vietnam and apply that history and knowledge to his critiques of the United States' foreign policy in the early stages of the Second Indochina War. Earlier, the Viet Minh had successfully subverted French authority and dominated local Vietnamese governance in northern areas of Vietnam. Fall recognized that their successors, the National Liberation Front, adopted similar methods of political subversion over open-conventional war against the United States. This led Fall to recognize the importance of political processes of governance that were often unmeasurable by military-oriented parameters, writing "When a country is being subverted it is not being outfought; it is being out-administered." Fall studied war by studying the political administration of it, not just how it unfolded through militarized mechanisms of power.Fall was a dedicated anti-communist but he believed that the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) did not pose a geostrategic or national security threat to the United States. He attempted to explain the historically strained relationship between Vietnam and China and that DRV leadership was as fearful of Chinese encroachment as it was of France's return to Indochina after World War II. The importance of Vietnamese history, a major point of emphasis for Fall in his scholarship, was not heeded when it could have made a difference among American foreign policy-makers. Applying his knowledge of France's recent history in Indochina, he described how the United States would also face an insurmountable task should it engage in an overmilitarized intervention. Yet, because of his public criticism of foreign policy, he was surveilled by the FBI and blocked from employment at the Royal Institute in Phenom Penh by the U.S. State Department in 1958. This event, stemming from an article Fall published in May 1958, compelled Fall to find other non-government channels to research and write about the onset of the Second Indochina War in late 1958 and 1959.
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650 4 $a Asian history. $2 bicssc $3 1099323
653 $a Fall, Bernard
653 $a First Indochina War
653 $a Indochina
653 $a Insurgency
653 $a Revolutionary warfare
653 $a Second Indochina War
690 $a 0601
690 $a 0222
690 $a 0332
710 2 $a State University of New York at Albany. $b History. $3 2092101
773 0 $t Dissertations Abstracts International $g 81-02A.
790 $a 0668
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2019
793 $a English
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=13864995