東華大學圖書館 |

Language: English

Help

回圖書館首頁

手機版館藏查詢

Back to Search results for [ null ]

Switch To: Labeled | MARC Mode | ISBD

Shareholder Litigation as a Discipli...

Talijan, Vuk.

Linked to FindBook

Google Book

Amazon

博客來

Shareholder Litigation as a Disciplining Device: Evidence From Firms' Financial Policies.

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Shareholder Litigation as a Disciplining Device: Evidence From Firms' Financial Policies./
Author:	Talijan, Vuk.
Published:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 2018,
Description:	118 p.
Notes:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 79-06(E), Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International79-06A(E).
Subject:	Management. -
Online resource:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=11016112

Shareholder Litigation as a Disciplining Device: Evidence From Firms' Financial Policies.
Talijan, Vuk.

Shareholder Litigation as a Disciplining Device: Evidence From Firms' Financial Policies. - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2018 - 118 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 79-06(E), Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Southern California, 2018.

Shareholder litigation risk varies across time and across firms. When shareholder litigation risk is high, it can increase (decrease) a firm's cash and investment before (after) a lawsuit filing. When shareholder litigation risk is low, little to no impact occurs. A quasi-natural experiment using two legal shocks, In re IPO and CAFA, supports a causal interpretation. Shareholder litigation risk can also impact a firm's debt around the time of a lawsuit filing, but the empirical results are less clear-cut. In addition to the empirical results, I offer a theoretical framework to help explain the changes in cash, investment, and debt around the time of a lawsuit filing. The framework posits that an entrepreneur, at risk of a lawsuit filing, may save cash as a precautionary measure. When the cash accumulates and a lawsuit filing does not occur, an entrepreneur increases investment in hopes of superior future performance. But if future performance wanes notwithstanding, shareholders then file a lawsuit against their entrepreneur. When cash is limited, debt may act as an alternative precautionary measure against a lawsuit filing. Finally, the theoretical framework emphasizes a benefit of shareholder litigation---the option to file a lawsuit against an entrepreneur encourages shareholders to fund projects and to retain entrepreneurs.Subjects--Topical Terms:

516664
Management.

Shareholder Litigation as a Disciplining Device: Evidence From Firms' Financial Policies.
LDR:02310nmm a2200301 4500 001 2201388
005 20190429062348.5
008 201008s2018 ||||||||||||||||| ||eng d
035 $a (MiAaPQ)AAI11016112
035 $a (MiAaPQ)US_Calif_478454
035 $a AAI11016112
040 $a MiAaPQ $c MiAaPQ
100 1 $a Talijan, Vuk. $3 3428107
245 1 0 $a Shareholder Litigation as a Disciplining Device: Evidence From Firms' Financial Policies.
260 1 $a Ann Arbor : $b ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, $c 2018
300 $a 118 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 79-06(E), Section: A.
500 $a Adviser: Kevin Murphy.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Southern California, 2018.
520 $a Shareholder litigation risk varies across time and across firms. When shareholder litigation risk is high, it can increase (decrease) a firm's cash and investment before (after) a lawsuit filing. When shareholder litigation risk is low, little to no impact occurs. A quasi-natural experiment using two legal shocks, In re IPO and CAFA, supports a causal interpretation. Shareholder litigation risk can also impact a firm's debt around the time of a lawsuit filing, but the empirical results are less clear-cut. In addition to the empirical results, I offer a theoretical framework to help explain the changes in cash, investment, and debt around the time of a lawsuit filing. The framework posits that an entrepreneur, at risk of a lawsuit filing, may save cash as a precautionary measure. When the cash accumulates and a lawsuit filing does not occur, an entrepreneur increases investment in hopes of superior future performance. But if future performance wanes notwithstanding, shareholders then file a lawsuit against their entrepreneur. When cash is limited, debt may act as an alternative precautionary measure against a lawsuit filing. Finally, the theoretical framework emphasizes a benefit of shareholder litigation---the option to file a lawsuit against an entrepreneur encourages shareholders to fund projects and to retain entrepreneurs.
590 $a School code: 0208.
650 4 $a Management. $3 516664
650 4 $a Business administration. $3 3168311
650 4 $a Finance. $3 542899
690 $a 0454
690 $a 0310
690 $a 0508
710 2 $a University of Southern California. $3 700129
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 79-06A(E).
790 $a 0208
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2018
793 $a English
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=11016112