東華大學圖書館 |

Language: English

Help

回圖書館首頁

手機版館藏查詢

Back to Search results for [ null ]

Switch To: Labeled | MARC Mode | ISBD

Governance mechanisms and shareholde...

Kim, Changhyun.

Linked to FindBook

Google Book

Amazon

博客來

Governance mechanisms and shareholder value: Evidence from the merger wave in the late 1990s.

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Governance mechanisms and shareholder value: Evidence from the merger wave in the late 1990s./
Author:	Kim, Changhyun.
Description:	103 p.
Notes:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 75-09(E), Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International75-09A(E).
Subject:	Commerce-Business. -
Online resource:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3622392
ISBN:	9781303941016

Governance mechanisms and shareholder value: Evidence from the merger wave in the late 1990s.
Kim, Changhyun.

Governance mechanisms and shareholder value: Evidence from the merger wave in the late 1990s. - 103 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 75-09(E), Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2014.

This item is not available from ProQuest Dissertations & Theses.

Corporate governance scholars have emphasized monitoring by institutional investors as a primary mechanism for resolving agency problems. However, the shareholders of acquiring firms experienced substantial wealth destruction during the M&A wave in the late 1990s in spite of increasing institutional ownership. I hypothesize that this paradox is due to behavioral difference in two categories of institutional investors (transient vs. dedicated). Empirically, I find that transient institutional investors encouraged M&A activities even during the unproductive, value-destroying M&A wave in the late 1990s. Furthermore, the level of transient institutional investors' ownership was negatively related to M&A performance measured by cumulative abnormal returns. By contrast, dedicated institutional investors did not significantly impact M&A performance. Overall, results suggest that during merger waves the monitoring by transient institutional investors fails to prevent shareholder value destruction and may actually encourage it.

ISBN: 9781303941016Subjects--Topical Terms:

3168423
Commerce-Business.

Governance mechanisms and shareholder value: Evidence from the merger wave in the late 1990s.
LDR:02094nmm a2200325 4500 001 2078143
005 20161122113930.5
008 170521s2014 ||||||||||||||||| ||eng d
020 $a 9781303941016
035 $a (MiAaPQ)AAI3622392
035 $a AAI3622392
040 $a MiAaPQ $c MiAaPQ
100 1 $a Kim, Changhyun. $3 1295792
245 1 0 $a Governance mechanisms and shareholder value: Evidence from the merger wave in the late 1990s.
300 $a 103 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 75-09(E), Section: A.
500 $a Adviser: Richard A. Bettis.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2014.
506 $a This item is not available from ProQuest Dissertations & Theses.
520 $a Corporate governance scholars have emphasized monitoring by institutional investors as a primary mechanism for resolving agency problems. However, the shareholders of acquiring firms experienced substantial wealth destruction during the M&A wave in the late 1990s in spite of increasing institutional ownership. I hypothesize that this paradox is due to behavioral difference in two categories of institutional investors (transient vs. dedicated). Empirically, I find that transient institutional investors encouraged M&A activities even during the unproductive, value-destroying M&A wave in the late 1990s. Furthermore, the level of transient institutional investors' ownership was negatively related to M&A performance measured by cumulative abnormal returns. By contrast, dedicated institutional investors did not significantly impact M&A performance. Overall, results suggest that during merger waves the monitoring by transient institutional investors fails to prevent shareholder value destruction and may actually encourage it.
590 $a School code: 0153.
650 4 $a Commerce-Business. $3 3168423
650 4 $a Management. $3 516664
650 4 $a Public policy. $3 532803
650 4 $a Banking. $2 bicssc $3 1557594
650 4 $a Finance. $3 542899
690 $a 0505
690 $a 0454
690 $a 0630
690 $a 0770
690 $a 0508
710 2 $a The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. $b Business Administration. $3 1026784
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 75-09A(E).
790 $a 0153
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2014
793 $a English
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3622392