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Performance-based voluntary group co...

Isik, Haci Bayram.

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Performance-based voluntary group contracts for nonpoint source water pollution control.

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Performance-based voluntary group contracts for nonpoint source water pollution control./
Author:	Isik, Haci Bayram.
Description:	137 p.
Notes:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 65-02, Section: B, page: 0632.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International65-02B.
Subject:	Environmental Sciences. -
Online resource:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3122592
ISBN:	0496699407

Performance-based voluntary group contracts for nonpoint source water pollution control.
Isik, Haci Bayram.

Performance-based voluntary group contracts for nonpoint source water pollution control. - 137 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 65-02, Section: B, page: 0632.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--The Ohio State University, 2004.

Pollution from nonpoint sources (NPS), and agriculture in particular, remains as one of the largest sources of water quality impairments in the United States. As is well known in the literature, there are many difficulties with designing regulations for reducing nonpoint source pollution (i.e., Tomasi, Segerson, and Braden, 1994). Uncertainty and asymmetric information are the key regulatory difficulties in the control of NPS. The main goal of this study is to describe a potential incentive scheme that can be applied in limited information situations. The incentive scheme involves a contract written between a point source of pollution and a small group of other nonpoint polluters in the watershed to reduce a specific load of pollution.

ISBN: 0496699407Subjects--Topical Terms:

676987
Environmental Sciences.

Performance-based voluntary group contracts for nonpoint source water pollution control.
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100 1 $a Isik, Haci Bayram. $3 1934464
245 1 0 $a Performance-based voluntary group contracts for nonpoint source water pollution control.
300 $a 137 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 65-02, Section: B, page: 0632.
500 $a Adviser: D. Lynn Forster.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--The Ohio State University, 2004.
520 $a Pollution from nonpoint sources (NPS), and agriculture in particular, remains as one of the largest sources of water quality impairments in the United States. As is well known in the literature, there are many difficulties with designing regulations for reducing nonpoint source pollution (i.e., Tomasi, Segerson, and Braden, 1994). Uncertainty and asymmetric information are the key regulatory difficulties in the control of NPS. The main goal of this study is to describe a potential incentive scheme that can be applied in limited information situations. The incentive scheme involves a contract written between a point source of pollution and a small group of other nonpoint polluters in the watershed to reduce a specific load of pollution.
520 $a In this study, I propose a group contract built upon the ideas of Stiglitz (1990) and Varian (1990), and originally applied to micro-lending arrangements in developing countries. The contract allows the nonpoint sources to enter the contract voluntarily, and will base on group performance. To handle the incentive problems typical in many principal agent problems, it incorporates joint liability, and peer pressure/monitoring to induce the nonpoint sources of pollution to meet their contractual obligations. It is shown that, depending on parameter values, this mechanism can potentially induce peer pressure/monitoring, alleviate moral hazard/free-rider problems within the group even though the contract offers them some level of fixed payment.
590 $a School code: 0168.
650 4 $a Environmental Sciences. $3 676987
650 4 $a Economics, Agricultural. $3 626648
650 4 $a Economics, General. $3 1017424
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710 2 0 $a The Ohio State University. $3 718944
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 65-02B.
790 1 0 $a Forster, D. Lynn, $e advisor
790 $a 0168
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2004
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3122592