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Expressing preferences with price-ve...

Day, Robert W.

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Expressing preferences with price-vector agents in combinatorial auctions.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Expressing preferences with price-vector agents in combinatorial auctions./
作者:	Day, Robert W.
面頁冊數:	253 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 65-07, Section: B, page: 3530.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International65-07B.
標題:	Applied Mechanics. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3139143
ISBN:	049686289X

Expressing preferences with price-vector agents in combinatorial auctions.
Day, Robert W.

Expressing preferences with price-vector agents in combinatorial auctions. - 253 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 65-07, Section: B, page: 3530.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Maryland, College Park, 2004.

In this work, we investigate two combinatorial auction formats in which each bidding bidder may be represented by a collection of unit-demand or price-vector agents. In the first model, bidder preferences are aggregated in a Bid Table, through which a bidder in a combinatorial auction may express several forms of subadditive preferences. We show that the gross substitutes property holds for this model, and design a large-scale combinatorial auction using bid tables as a demand revelation stage, determining linear price signals for later stages. The constraints of this model coincide naturally with the restrictions of recently proposed FAA landing-slot auctions, and we provide a slot auction design based on this model.

ISBN: 049686289XSubjects--Topical Terms:

1018410
Applied Mechanics.

Expressing preferences with price-vector agents in combinatorial auctions.
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500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 65-07, Section: B, page: 3530.
500 $a Director: Subramanian Raghavan.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Maryland, College Park, 2004.
520 $a In this work, we investigate two combinatorial auction formats in which each bidding bidder may be represented by a collection of unit-demand or price-vector agents. In the first model, bidder preferences are aggregated in a Bid Table, through which a bidder in a combinatorial auction may express several forms of subadditive preferences. We show that the gross substitutes property holds for this model, and design a large-scale combinatorial auction using bid tables as a demand revelation stage, determining linear price signals for later stages. The constraints of this model coincide naturally with the restrictions of recently proposed FAA landing-slot auctions, and we provide a slot auction design based on this model.
520 $a In a second model, we explore the more complex behavior possible when each bidder's collection of price-vector agents coordinate based on a bidder-specified ordering of the auction items. With this coordination each bidder is able to convey a rich set of preferences, including the ability to express both superadditive and subadditive bundle synergies (i.e., substitutes and complements). The instructions for this collection of agents are tabulated in a lower-triangular Matrix Bid, and we compare the use of matrix bids to other compact techniques for writing down a wide variety of bidding information. We show that the winner determination problem for this Matrix Bid Auction is NP-hard, provide results from a series of computational experiments, and develop IP techniques for improving run time.
520 $a In addition to the results on price-vector agents, bid tables, and matrix bidding, we present a new technique for achieving bidder-Pareto-optimal core outcomes in a sealed-bid combinatorial auction. The key idea of this iterative procedure is the formulation of the separation problem for core constraints at an arbitrary point in winner payment space.
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