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The role of information in supply ch...

Zhu, Xiaowei.

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The role of information in supply chain contracts.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	The role of information in supply chain contracts./
作者:	Zhu, Xiaowei.
面頁冊數:	82 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 67-06, Section: A, page: 2239.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International67-06A.
標題:	Business Administration, Management. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3222413
ISBN:	9780542750854

The role of information in supply chain contracts.
Zhu, Xiaowei.

The role of information in supply chain contracts. - 82 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 67-06, Section: A, page: 2239.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of Wisconsin - Milwaukee, 2006.

My dissertation includes two business scenarios addressing different asymmetric information phenomena in supply chain management.

ISBN: 9780542750854Subjects--Topical Terms:

626628
Business Administration, Management.

The role of information in supply chain contracts.
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500 $a Adviser: Samar K. Mukhopadhyay.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of Wisconsin - Milwaukee, 2006.
520 $a My dissertation includes two business scenarios addressing different asymmetric information phenomena in supply chain management.
520 $a We study the mixed channel issue in chapter 3. In this model, a firm selling through the traditional supply chain of wholesaler and retailer also opens a direct channel to the customer through Internet sales. Both the channels have their respective advantages making this business model attractive to the manufacturer. But it also leads to channel conflict with retailer feeling threatened by the direct competition. One way of eliminating the possibility of this channel conflict, is proposed in our research, where the retailer is allowed to add value to the product so as to differentiate its offering to the customers. The retailer is also given full authority to make pricing decision. Under this scenario, a model is presented to obtain the optimum decisions on prices by both the parties, the amount of value-adding by the retailer, and the manufacturer's wholesale price to the retailer. Our model incorporates information asymmetry where the manufacturer has incomplete information about the retailer's cost of adding value. We obtain closed form contracts for the incomplete information case and compare them with those when complete channel coordination is present. We develop a number of managerial guidelines and identify future research topics.
520 $a We study the outsourcing problem in chapter 4. Outsourcing is fast becoming an important strategy for firms to reduce cost. We use the call center as an example to study optimal outsourcing contracts where the offshore firm has private cost information for quality improvement giving rise to information asymmetry. We use a game theoretic model to derive optimal contracts under both full and asymmetric information. We derive optimal quality strategy and the value of information, and present several managerial insights.
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