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An epistemological argument for mora...

Rippon, Simon Ian.

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An epistemological argument for moral response-dependence.

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,印刷品 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	An epistemological argument for moral response-dependence./
作者:	Rippon, Simon Ian.
面頁冊數:	269 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 71-07, Section: A, page: 2484.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International71-07A.
標題:	Epistemology. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3415271
ISBN:	9781124093727

An epistemological argument for moral response-dependence.
Rippon, Simon Ian.

An epistemological argument for moral response-dependence. - 269 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 71-07, Section: A, page: 2484.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Harvard University, 2010.

Perhaps the most common philosophical view about the nature of morality is non-naturalistic moral realism. According to this view, moral properties or facts or truths exist as features of the objective, mind-independent universe -- and they are, moreover, intrinsically normative and irreducible to naturalistic properties. The view seems to be at a special advantage in accounting for the objectivity and normativity of morality. There are, however, serious objections to it. I offer a new, strengthened epistemological objection to non-naturalistic moral realism by arguing that we could never rationally decide to accept our ordinary first-order moral beliefs (e.g. the belief that killing people for fun is wrong) if we were to understand them as beliefs about non-naturalistic realist normative truths. Thus, we could not maintain them in reflective equilibrium. This unacceptable skeptical outcome motivates my abandonment of non-naturalistic moral realism.

ISBN: 9781124093727Subjects--Topical Terms:

896969
Epistemology.

An epistemological argument for moral response-dependence.
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245 1 3 $a An epistemological argument for moral response-dependence.
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500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 71-07, Section: A, page: 2484.
500 $a Adviser: Christine M. Korsgaard.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--Harvard University, 2010.
520 $a Perhaps the most common philosophical view about the nature of morality is non-naturalistic moral realism. According to this view, moral properties or facts or truths exist as features of the objective, mind-independent universe -- and they are, moreover, intrinsically normative and irreducible to naturalistic properties. The view seems to be at a special advantage in accounting for the objectivity and normativity of morality. There are, however, serious objections to it. I offer a new, strengthened epistemological objection to non-naturalistic moral realism by arguing that we could never rationally decide to accept our ordinary first-order moral beliefs (e.g. the belief that killing people for fun is wrong) if we were to understand them as beliefs about non-naturalistic realist normative truths. Thus, we could not maintain them in reflective equilibrium. This unacceptable skeptical outcome motivates my abandonment of non-naturalistic moral realism.
520 $a I develop an alternative metaethical theory by first examining other kinds of norms about which metaphysical and epistemological skepticism is rarely expressed. I focus on an ordinary game with a set of conventionally determined rules and argue that it can only be understood as a normative practice -- that is, as constituted by a set of norms that provide reasons and requirements to the players in virtue of their commitment to it. Further investigation yields a response-dependence biconditional which indicates how the relevant reasons and requirements are determined by people's judgments. I argue that this response-dependence biconditional both provides for a constructivist, anti-realist account of the relevant reasons and requirements, and also provides for an explanation of how we can rationally accept our most reflective beliefs about them.
520 $a My theory is extended to account for diverse kinds of reasons and requirements by showing why and how we construct different kinds of normative practices. I sketch the nature of, and some of the differences between, the normative practices that I believe account for the instrumental, epistemic, and aesthetic reasons and requirements that we are subject to. Finally, I offer a response-dependence account of morality as a cooperative normative practice by combining T.M. Scanlon's contractualist formula with a sentimentalist account of reasonable objections to candidate principles.
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