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Catching codes: The institutionaliza...

Wetterberg, Anna Maria.

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Catching codes: The institutionalization of private labor regulation in the global apparel industry.

Record Type:	Language materials, printed : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Catching codes: The institutionalization of private labor regulation in the global apparel industry./
Author:	Wetterberg, Anna Maria.
Description:	220 p.
Notes:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 71-06, Section: A, page: 2237.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International71-06A.
Subject:	Economics, Labor. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3411187
ISBN:	9781124038025

Catching codes: The institutionalization of private labor regulation in the global apparel industry.
Wetterberg, Anna Maria.

Catching codes: The institutionalization of private labor regulation in the global apparel industry. - 220 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 71-06, Section: A, page: 2237.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of California, Berkeley, 2009.

Over the past decade, multinational apparel firms have faced mounting pressure for better treatment of workers in poor countries. In response, many have adopted codes of conduct detailing labor standards to be respected in their outsourced production. Such private regulation is no guarantee for improvements in labor conditions, but could function as a stop-gap measure until a global framework for protecting workers' rights is developed. This dissertation traces patterns of self-regulation in the global apparel industry through social and physical space, as well as through time, to analyze the prospects for building on such soft law to protect workers.

ISBN: 9781124038025Subjects--Topical Terms:

1019135
Economics, Labor.

Catching codes: The institutionalization of private labor regulation in the global apparel industry.
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100 1 $a Wetterberg, Anna Maria. $3 1673698
245 1 0 $a Catching codes: The institutionalization of private labor regulation in the global apparel industry.
300 $a 220 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 71-06, Section: A, page: 2237.
500 $a Advisers: Peter Evans; Neil Fligstein.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of California, Berkeley, 2009.
520 $a Over the past decade, multinational apparel firms have faced mounting pressure for better treatment of workers in poor countries. In response, many have adopted codes of conduct detailing labor standards to be respected in their outsourced production. Such private regulation is no guarantee for improvements in labor conditions, but could function as a stop-gap measure until a global framework for protecting workers' rights is developed. This dissertation traces patterns of self-regulation in the global apparel industry through social and physical space, as well as through time, to analyze the prospects for building on such soft law to protect workers.
520 $a Using quantitative and qualitative data, I demonstrate that private regulation has become institutionalized in parts of the industry. Codes of conduct are taken for granted by major brands, but have also spread to firms from countries with a national political culture that legitimates corporate responsibility for worker welfare. Firms that already take worker protection for granted readily adopt self-regulation. At the other end of the spectrum, firms that lack a pro-labor national political culture abstain from private regulation, even when criticized for working conditions.
520 $a This form of private regulation is centered on buyers, who retain control over the content of codes, design of monitoring, and choice of enforcement mechanisms. Further, as adoption is often a symbolic act designed to maintain legitimacy in the headquarters country, improvements in factory conditions rarely result.
520 $a Based on the above findings, one might conclude that there is no scope for private regulation to improve working conditions in the global apparel industry. In contrast, I also demonstrate that niches within the broader apparel market have been transformed in ways that empower non-corporate actors to manage a more stringent form of private regulation. In these socially regulated markets, a version of self-regulation has developed that is mandatory, uniform, and enforceable. By drawing on the distinctions between hard and soft law and case studies of socially regulated markets, I demonstrate that private regulation implemented in such contexts is more likely to achieve substantive improvements in working conditions than voluntary labor standards over which buyers retain ultimate control.
590 $a School code: 0028.
650 4 $a Economics, Labor. $3 1019135
650 4 $a Sociology, Industrial and Labor Relations. $3 1017858
650 4 $a Sociology, Organizational. $3 1018023
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710 2 $a University of California, Berkeley. $3 687832
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 71-06A.
790 1 0 $a Evans, Peter, $e advisor
790 1 0 $a Fligstein, Neil, $e advisor
790 $a 0028
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2009
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3411187