東華大學圖書館 |

語系: 繁體中文

說明(常見問題)

回圖書館首頁

手機版館藏查詢

登入

回首頁 到查詢結果 [ null ]

切換: 標籤 | MARC模式 | ISBD

When the highest bidder loses the au...

Decarolis, Francesco.

FindBook

Google Book

Amazon

博客來

When the highest bidder loses the auction: Theory and evidence from public procurement.

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,印刷品 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	When the highest bidder loses the auction: Theory and evidence from public procurement./
作者:	Decarolis, Francesco.
面頁冊數:	123 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 70-06, Section: A, page: 2152.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International70-06A.
標題:	Economics, General. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3362008
ISBN:	9781109208641

When the highest bidder loses the auction: Theory and evidence from public procurement.
Decarolis, Francesco.

When the highest bidder loses the auction: Theory and evidence from public procurement. - 123 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 70-06, Section: A, page: 2152.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of Chicago, 2009.

When bids do not represent binding commitments, the use of a first price sealed bid auction favors those bidders who are less penalized from reneging on their bids. These bidders are the most likely to win but also the most likely to default on their bid. In this paper I study theoretically two methods often used in public procurement to deal with this problem: (1) augmenting the first price auction with an ex-post verification of the responsiveness of the bids and (2) using an average bid auction in which the winner is the bidder whose bid is closest to the simple average of all the bids. I show that when penalties for defaulting are asymmetric across bidders and when their valuations are characterized by a predominant common component, the average bid auction is preferred over the standard first price by an auctioneer when the costs due to the winner's bankruptcy are high enough. Depending on the cost of the ex-post verification, the average bid auction can be dominated by the first price with monitoring. I use a new dataset of Italian public procurement auctions, run alternately using a form of the average bid auction or the augmented first price, to structurally estimate the bids' verification cost, the firms' mark up and the inefficiency generated by the average bid auctions.

ISBN: 9781109208641Subjects--Topical Terms:

1017424
Economics, General.

When the highest bidder loses the auction: Theory and evidence from public procurement.
LDR:02179nam 2200265 4500 001 1394942
005 20110506125526.5
008 130515s2009 ||||||||||||||||| ||eng d
020 $a 9781109208641
035 $a (UMI)AAI3362008
035 $a AAI3362008
040 $a UMI $c UMI
100 1 $a Decarolis, Francesco. $3 1673600
245 1 0 $a When the highest bidder loses the auction: Theory and evidence from public procurement.
300 $a 123 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 70-06, Section: A, page: 2152.
500 $a Adviser: Ali Hortacsu.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of Chicago, 2009.
520 $a When bids do not represent binding commitments, the use of a first price sealed bid auction favors those bidders who are less penalized from reneging on their bids. These bidders are the most likely to win but also the most likely to default on their bid. In this paper I study theoretically two methods often used in public procurement to deal with this problem: (1) augmenting the first price auction with an ex-post verification of the responsiveness of the bids and (2) using an average bid auction in which the winner is the bidder whose bid is closest to the simple average of all the bids. I show that when penalties for defaulting are asymmetric across bidders and when their valuations are characterized by a predominant common component, the average bid auction is preferred over the standard first price by an auctioneer when the costs due to the winner's bankruptcy are high enough. Depending on the cost of the ex-post verification, the average bid auction can be dominated by the first price with monitoring. I use a new dataset of Italian public procurement auctions, run alternately using a form of the average bid auction or the augmented first price, to structurally estimate the bids' verification cost, the firms' mark up and the inefficiency generated by the average bid auctions.
590 $a School code: 0330.
650 4 $a Economics, General. $3 1017424
690 $a 0501
710 2 $a The University of Chicago. $3 1017389
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 70-06A.
790 1 0 $a Hortacsu, Ali, $e advisor
790 $a 0330
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2009
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3362008